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ABSTRACT
The Political Economy of Market Liberalization
by
Amy Pond
Chairs: William R. Clark and James D. Morrow
In the dissertation I explore the political sources of market liberalization and market
protection. In Chapter II, I argue that autocratic leaders use liberalization either to
stimulate the economy in their country and thereby preserve their autocracy, or, when
preservation is prohibitively costly, they use liberalization to constrain future tax rates
and protect their wealth in democracy. In stable autocracies, liberalization bolsters the
economy, thereby making revolution less attractive to the political opposition. In democ-
racy, liberalization makes assets more mobile and provides asset owners with a credible
exit option, thereby limiting redistribution.
Chapter III explores the impact of economic sanctions on future trade and financial
policies. Regardless of whether sanctions are effective in achieving concessions, sanctions
restrict international trade flows, creating rents for import-competing producers, who are
protected from international competition. These rents can then be used to pressure the
government to implement protectionist policies. Thus, sanctions create powerful interest
groups in the sanctioned country who seek market protection.
In Chapter IV, I distinguish between two types of financial restrictions: inflow restric-
tions, which limit the entry of capital into the country, and outflow restrictions, which
viii
limit capital exit from the country. Inflow restrictions benefit domestic capital owners,
who compete with foreign capital owners, while outflow restrictions benefit labor at the
expense of domestic capital owners, who lose the bargaining power associated with a
credible exit option. I derive and evaluate predictions for inflow and outflow restrictions
based on political institutions and market structure.
ix
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Economic growth is often credited with alleviating poverty and improving the lives of
people worldwide. Social scientists have identified a set of policies that increase growth,
including: liberal trading policies; investment protection; stable monetary policies, often
through independent central banks or fixed exchange rates; property rights; and unbi-
ased legal systems. Policymakers have implemented these policies to varying degrees,
and there is increasing recognition that the reasons for their deviations are political. If
we want to understand why some countries are poor and others wealthy, we do not just
need a clear understanding of economics. We also need to understand the political in-
centives of policymakers. This dissertation explores the political motivation for one set
of policy decisions, market liberalization, and its implications for economic development
and inequality.
There is overwhelming evidence that international trade and investment provide eco-
nomic benefits to countries as a whole. David Ricardo laid the theoretical foundation
for the benefits of free trade centuries ago: “Under a system of perfectly free commerce,
each country naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most
beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the
universal good of the whole” (Ricardo 1817, p. 133-134). More recently, scholars have
tried to quantify the size of these benefits. Using geography as an instrument for trade
flows to exclude confounding variables and isolate the direct effect of trade, Frankel and
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Romer find that a one percentage point increase in trade raises per person income by
two percent (Frankel and Romer 1999, p. 387). The benefits of trade are now widely
accepted, and scholars have turned to assessing the causes of trade protection.1
The benefits of open capital markets are more controversial. Bekaert, Harvey and
Lundblad (2005), Henry (2007) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) find that liberalization
increases growth, while Klein and Olivei (2008) and Schularick and Steger (2010) find the
opposite.2 Despite these contradictory findings, scholars generaly accept that when the
financial market is already competitive or property rights are provided, openness leads
to capital accumulation and market development (Rajan and Zingales 2003, Chinn and
Ito 2006, Prasad et al. 2007, Broner and Ventura 2010). Due to these benefits, increasing
international trade and capital market liberalization, and consequently facilitating trade
and capital flows, have become important foreign policy goals in their own right. In this
dissertation, I aim to isolate the political and economic factors that undermine trade
and financial liberalization and make it difficult for countries to reap the benefits often
associated with liberalization.
The dissertation answers the following question: When do policymakers allow capital
and goods to flow in and out of their countries? In Chapter II, I explore capital market
liberalization in autocracies. Extant research has found that democratization is more
likely under open capital markets (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Freeman and Quinn
2012), but, if liberalization is something policymakers control (and Chinn and Ito (2006)
show they do), why would survival-maximizing autocrats liberalize markets, especially if
that liberalization will cause them to lose power in the long-run? I identify conditions
under which capital market liberalization actually allows autocrats to prolong their tenure
and protect their wealth.
Capital market liberalization has two distinct effects. The first effect is to constrain
tax rates, as capital owners may move their capital out of the country when taxes are
1For example, see Schattschneider (1935), Rogowski (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Milner
(1999), McGillivray (2004).
2See Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) and Kose et al. (2009) for an overview of the literature.
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increased (Oatley 1999, Basinger and Hallerberg 2004). This constraining effect is partic-
ularly beneficial for the economic elite in democracy. Liberalization prevents redistribu-
tion and, therefore, helps explain the persistence of high inequality in many democratic
countries. Thus, autocrats may liberalize markets in anticipation of democratization in
order to minimize the cost of redistribution.
The second effect of liberalization is to stimulate the economy in capital scarce coun-
tries: foreign capital enters the country to benefit from higher interest rates when markets
are opened. The entry of capital increases competition among capital owners, thereby
decreasing interest rates and increasing wages. These distributional consequences are
often thought to harm domestic capital owners and to benefit labor. The elite, therefore,
may use liberalization as a transfer to the labor force. The transfer makes revolution less
attractive, as revolution disrupts the economy. Thus, autocrats, who are often members
of the economic elite, may liberalize the capital market, sacrifice capital returns, and, in
exchange, maintain their political position. Because liberalization has these two effects,
autocrats pursue liberalization for two purposes: either to deter democratization and
stabilize their regime or to constrain tax rates in anticipation of democratization.
The game theoretic model identifies the conditions under which these outcomes oc-
cur. In doing so, the model yields testable implications. Liberalization in capital scarce
countries decreases inequality as it increases wages and decreases interest rates. How-
ever, the effect is more pronounced in autocracies than in democracies. In democracy,
liberalization reduces redistribution, thereby increasing inequality relative to democra-
cies without liberal capital markets. I find that liberalization decreases inequality, but
the effect goes away (and may even increase inequality) as countries become more demo-
cratic. I illustrate the theory with a brief description of economic policy in Chile and in
Indonesia.
In Chapter III, I argue that international economic sanctions undermine trade and
financial liberalization. Economic sanctions directly restrict the import and export of
goods and services in the sanctioned country, but they also have indirect effects. Sanctions
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often eliminate foreign competition and benefit import-competing producers. At the same
time, sanctions harm those producers who would otherwise export their goods abroad.
Consequently, sanctions empower an interest group with protectionist interests: those
producers who gain economically from sanctions seek to replace the protection furnished
by sanctions with trade and capital market restrictions, and they have the resources to
achieve their preferred policies. Using data on sanctions and market openness, I find
that trade sanctions increase tariff rates and financial sanctions increase capital market
restrictions.
Existing works in political science, the first two substantive chapters of the disserta-
tion included, have largely assumed that capital account liberalization is one-dimensional,
and they aggregate many different types of capital account restrictions into one composite
measure. Nevertheless, each of the components may be pursued for different purposes. In
Chapter IV, I distinguish between two forms of financial restrictions: inflow restrictions
and outflow restrictions. Liberalizing inflow restrictions likely benefits labor groups, as
foreign capital enters the market, while liberalizing outflow restrictions benefits capital
owners, as it opens up investment options abroad. Particularist political institutions
should favor the interests of capital owners over labor. Accordingly, I expect countries
with particularist institutions to employ more inflow restrictions and fewer outflow re-
strictions. The relationship should be particularly pronounced when capital owners are
concentrated. Chapter IV examines inflow and outflow restrictions under different polit-
ical institutions and different market conditions.
This dissertation advances our understanding of the political foundations of economic
development. Market liberalization is important for efficiency, specialization, and capital
accumulation. However, economic policies are often selected for political purposes, and
they may or may not foster economic growth. Political scientists have long sought to
understand why policymakers do not select economically optimal policies. My research
improves our understanding of economic policy by investigating the interconnectedness
of policies themselves and their relation to political institutions.
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CHAPTER II
Capital Market Liberalization
2.1 Introduction
According to standard models of policymaking in democracy, democratization should
usher in redistribution: the median voter is empowered by democratic institutions and
prefers more redistribution than the elite who rule in most autocracies (Meltzer and
Richard 1981). Contrary to expectations, redistribution is the exception rather than
the rule, and many democratic societies remain highly unequal (Albertus and Menaldo
2013, Kaufman 2009). In fact, low-income voters may not even demand redistribution
(Haggard and Kaufman 2012). Furthermore, many transitions to democracy entail little
or no redistribution. What is missing from our theoretical accounts of democratization:
why doesn’t democratization lead to redistribution? Recent research recognizes that the
openness of the capital market affects the severity of redistribution in democracy (Ace-
moglu and Robinson 2006, Freeman and Quinn 2012). According to the theories, assets
are more mobile under open capital markets. Even seemingly immobile assets may be
broken up into shares and bought and sold by investors, allowing asset owners to diversify
their holdings and protecting them against concentrated losses. The increase in mobil-
ity associated with openness reduces the redistributive pressure facing elites following
democratization, thereby making democratization more likely in open countries.
However, extant research in democratization takes capital mobility as a given. Re-
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searchers do not consider why some markets are more open and therefore why assets are
more mobile in some countries than in others. We know that policymakers manipulate
the openness of the capital market for political reasons (e.g., Quinn and Incla´n 1997,
Brooks and Kurtz 2007). If openness ameliorates redistributive pressure and policymak-
ers control openness, why would autocrats ever maintain closed markets? Furthermore,
capital markets are open in many stable autocratic countries; why do they open markets
even when democratization is unlikely?
To answer these questions, this chapter integrates theories of democratization and
factor mobility with the economic intuition about the distributional consequences of
openness. I identify two primary political motivations for autocrats to liberalize capi-
tal markets. First, when preventing democratization is feasible, the autocratic elite use
transfers to make the political opposition indifferent between revolting and conceding to
existing autocratic rule. Liberalization makes revolution more costly, as it facilitates the
entry of foreign investment, which acts as a transfer from the autocratic elite to the work-
ing class. The elite in many autocratic countries benefit from closed, under-developed
capital markets. The elite often control substantial wealth, and they are able to charge
high premiums on their investment precisely because the closed capital market prevents
the entry of foreign competitors. Capital market openness, therefore, reduces elite rents.
The entry of foreign capital also increases competition for domestic labor and thereby
increases wages (e.g., Stolper and Samuelson 1941, Frieden 1991, Jensen and Rosas 2007,
Pinto 2013).
In addition to these distributional consequences, liberalization makes revolution more
costly for the political opposition. Revolution often disrupts the economy, and this dis-
ruption is more costly when the economy is open and dependent on foreign investment.
Thus, liberalization may be used as a transfer to avert revolution and stabilize the au-
tocracy.
Second, when preventing democratization is prohibitively costly, autocratic elites also
liberalize capital markets. In this context, market liberalization fosters capital market
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development and makes assets more mobile. Capital mobility constrains tax rates and
protects the elite’s wealth in the face of impending democratization. Anticipating that
the elite would move their assets abroad if extractive tax policies are selected, democratic
leaders select policies that are favorable to the elite (e.g., Block 1977, Lindblom 1977,
Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988, Oatley 1999). Thus, the theory provides insight into
the puzzle of why little redistribution is realized in democracies. Autocrats often find
ways to protect their wealth before democratization happens (Baldez and Carey 1999,
Carey 2002, Albertus and Menaldo 2013). In democracies with open capital markets,
even when the majority of the population prefer redistribution, this same majority might
maintain the status quo in order to retain mobile investment. Policymakers may even
avoid discussions of redistribution for fear of deterring investment when markets are open.
Consequently, capital market liberalization is present in many democracies with limited
redistribution and in some stable autocracies.
This chapter presents a game theoretic model that captures these two different mo-
tivations for capital market liberalization and their implications for regime change. The
model has multiple empirical implications. First, the probability of democratization does
not always increase in liberalization. In fact, because liberalization may be used to pro-
long autocracies, there are many stable autocracies with fully liberalized capital markets,
and the probability of democratization may actually decrease in liberalization. Second,
liberalization decreases inequality in autocracy, as it increases wages and reduces interest
rates. In democracy, liberalization has the same distributional effect, but it also reduces
tax rates. Thus, the impact of liberalization on inequality in democracy is ambiguous.
The chapter provides preliminary evidence that is consistent with the model.
The paper proceeds as follows. I first identify the equilibrium financial policy and
regime type using a game theoretic model. The possible equilibria and their implications
are briefly described in the text. Formal proofs are in the appendix. I then discuss and
evaluate the model predictions. I conclude with thoughts for future research.
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2.2 Regime Change and Capital Liberalization
This section describes a Markov model of economic policymaking and regime transi-
tion. Markov models include states, and actors may have different strategies available to
them depending on their current state. Further, the actions taken in any state may affect
which state the actors move to in the future. States are a particularly useful way to model
political institutions, because the role of actors is different under different institutions and
actors impact the durability of institutions. In the model here, the amount of financial
openness selected by the autocrat affects not only his utility in autocracy but also the
probability of democratization and his utility under democratic institutions should they
result. Transition between the democratic and autocratic states may happen through
revolution, ‘democracy from below’, or from elite extension of the franchise, ‘democracy
from above’.
There are two actors in the model, the poor and the elite. They interact to produce
different political regimes and policies. The game is infinitely repeated, but the regime
type determines the state of the game and the actions available to each player. Although
the poor and elite are groups of individual actors, they are treated as unitary actors in
the model, as individuals in either group share the same preferences with other mem-
bers of their own group. I assume that the elites are wealthier than the poor before tax
transfers are made. Elites derive utility from the returns on capital investments, while
the poor derive utility from their wages. The elite control policy in autocracy, while the
poor, who make up a majority of the population in the country, control policy decisions
in democracy.1 Even if they are not politicians themselves, economic elites often have in-
fluence over policy decisions in an autocracy. Either they are political elites who amassed
wealth through rent-seeking,2 or they are economic elites who influence political decisions
1This assumption is consistent with the Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) model. Their model focused
on reversions to autocracy, and democracy was only possible following elite extension of the franchise.
Revolution was a terminal state and could never lead to democracy.
2For instance, leaders with small winning coalitions provide more targeted transfers to their supporters
according to selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 88 & 101). Over time, these transfers
create a wealthy political elite.
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through bribes and other transfers. Although economic elites also have political influence
in democracy, their influence is exaggerated in autocracy where institutions provide fewer
constraints. The next section details the states and strategies available to the actors. It
is followed by a description of the actors’ utility functions, the economy in the country,
the equilibrium of the game and insights derived from the model.
2.2.1 States and Actions
There are three states in the model: autocracy, revolution and democracy. One
should think of the states as different institutional settings, where institutions constrain
behavior in various ways, but institutions are themselves the product of past interactions.
The payoffs of the actors and strategies available to them depend on the present state.
The poor select the tax rate in the democratic state, while the elite select the tax rate
in the autocratic state. Revolution is included as its own state in the model, because
economic production is interrupted during periods of revolution, and the revolution state
represents a period of institutional change; neither democratic nor autocratic institutions
govern behavior during revolution.
The probabilities of transition between the states result from the strategies selected
in each state. The game begins in autocracy and continues in autocracy if the poor
concede to the elite’s policies. Revolution results if the poor mobilize for revolution and
the elite ignore their threat. The state returns to autocracy if revolution is unsuccessful.
Democracy results from a successful revolution or from the elite’s decision to extend the
franchise and democratize the country. Figure 2.1 presents the sequence of play in each
state, which is described here.
Autocracy
1. The elite select the tax rate, τe, and the level of market liberalization, θ.
2. The poor decide to mobilize for revolution or to concede. If the poor concede,
payoffs are realized according to τe, θ, and the state remains autocracy.
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Figure 2.1: Sequence of Play in Each State
Autocracy
Elite τe, θ Poor
concede
(1− τe)rsk, wsl + τersk −→ Autocracy
mobilize
Elite
democratize
(1− τe)rsk, wsl + τersk −→ Democracy
ignore
(1− τe)rsk, wsl + τersk −→ Revolution
Revolution
Nature
succeed
ρ
−ce, − cp −→ Democracy
fail
1− ρ −ce, − cp −→ Autocracy
Democracy
Poor τp Elite
flee
krgθ, wf l + rfk(1− θ) −→ Terminally
stay
(1− τp)rsk, wsl + τprsk −→ Terminally
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3. If the poor mobilize for revolution, the elite decide whether to democratize the po-
litical system or to ignore the poor’s mobilization. Regardless of the elite’s decision,
payoffs in the present period are realized according to τe, θ. However, if the elite
democratize, they proceed to democracy in the next period. If the elite ignore the
mobilization, they proceed to revolution.
Revolution
1. Nature determines whether the revolution is successful. With probability ρ, the
revolution succeeds, and with probability 1 − ρ, the revolution fails. Economic
activity stops during the revolution, and the elite and poor receive a payoff of −ce
and −cp respectively in the present period. If the revolution fails, they proceed to
autocracy. If the revolution succeeds, they proceed to democracy.
Democracy
1. The poor, who hold political power in democracy, select the tax rate, τp.
2. After observing τp, the elite decide whether to flee, moving their assets out of the
country, or to stay, retaining their current level of investment in the country. If the
elite stay, their payoffs are realized according to τp. If the elite flee, they are no
longer able to constrain taxes with the threat of flight, the poor seize their assets,
and the elite only receive payment on their assets invested outside the country.
3. Democracy is a terminal state: once reached, the actors remain in democracy for-
ever. The payoffs are realized according to τp, θ for infinite periods.
By setting up the game in this consecutive move manner, the elite’s first move impacts
not only their first-period payoffs but also the probability of transitioning between states
and their payoffs in those states. Thus, the elite anticipate the response of the poor,
as well as their own response to the threat of revolution, when they select the tax rate
and level of liberalization. This structure enables the elite to use openness to prevent
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revolution and to constrain the tax rate in democracy, should democracy result. This
strategic interaction will inform the equilibrium of the game.
While I assume that the elite control both the tax rate and capital market liberaliza-
tion in autocracy, the poor only control the tax rate in democracy. Although democratic
policymakers have control over liberalization in the long-term, the tax rate they select
immediately after democratization is constrained by the existing level of openness. It is
unlikely that democratic policymakers could revise the amount of liberalization rapidly
enough to prevent flight, and even discussion of restrictions on mobility may be enough
to trigger flight. Flight is seldom observed, because, once markets are open, the threat
of flight is often sufficient to constrain policymakers.3
2.2.2 Utility Functions
In the revolution state, the economy stops and the elite and poor pay the cost of
revolution in that period: ce and cp respectively. In the autocracy and democracy states,
the economy functions, and the elite receive income from interest charged on their capital
which is invested in production. The utility function of the elite in the democracy and
autocracy states is: ue = (1− τ)rk, where r is the interest rate or return to their capital
investment, k is the domestic capital endowment, and τ is the tax rate charged on the
elite’s income. The tax rate in the model is entirely redistributive from the elite to the
poor: the elite retain (1−τ) of their income and they transfer τ of their income to the poor.
Foreign capital is not taxed.4 After the transfer is made, the elite’s remaining income is:
(1− τ)rk. Based on their utility function alone, the elite would like to maximize interest
and minimize transfers. However, due to the poor’s threat of revolution in autocracy, the
elite may implement transfers even when they control policy in autocracy.
3The threat of flight is particularly constraining as the capital market deepens and economic suc-
cess in the country relies on investment (Tornell, Westermann and Mart´ınez 2003, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache 2006, Mishkin 2007).
4The relaxation of this assumption opens up the possibility that elites benefit from openness through
taxation of foreign investment. However, many studies have demonstrated the difficulty of taxing mobile
capital and governments often provide incentives to attract investment (e.g., Li 2006, Desai, Foley and
Hines Jr. 2006).
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In the autocracy and democracy states, the poor receive income from their wages and
tax transfers from the elite. The utility function of the poor is: up = wl + τrk, where
w is the wage rate, l is the labor endowment in the country, and τrk is the poor’s share
of elite income. The poor would like to maximize wages and tax transfers. However,
due to the elite’s ability to move assets abroad in democracy, the poor may refrain from
redistribution even when they control policy in democracy. The wage and interest rates
are determined by the domestic economy, which is described in the following section.
2.2.3 The Economy
In autocracy and democracy, the economy functions and the wage and interest rate are
determined using the following Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns
to scale: y = lβK1−β, where l is the labor endowment, K is the total amount of capital
in the country and β < 1. The domestic economy is assumed to be competitive, which
implies that the wage and interest rates are determined by the following equations: w =
βK1−β
l1−β and r =
(1−β)lβ
Kβ
. Consequently, factor returns depend on the relative scarcity of
capital and labor.
The total amount of capital in the country depends on the capital endowment, which
is owned by the elite, and the amount of foreign capital that enters the market. Entry of
foreign capital depends on the level of market liberalization, θ ∈ [0, 1]. The total capital
invested in the country is: K = k + aθ, where k is the domestic capital endowment and
a is a scalar that represents the attractiveness of the market. When a is large, more
foreign capital seeks to enter the market. a could depend on considerations like the cost
of production in the country, including the availability of raw materials, infrastructure
and the distance to market, as well as the availability of foreign capital. Note that wages
increase as foreign capital enters the market, while the interest rate decreases.5 All else
equal, the poor prefer more capital market liberalization, while the elite prefer to limit
5This is consistent with existing work that shows that labor benefits from investment (e.g., Jensen
and Rosas 2007, Pinto 2013).
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liberalization and benefit from the relative scarcity of their capital. However, all else
is not equal; capital market liberalization also makes assets more mobile and facilitates
capital flight.
Thus far, we have discussed the total amount of capital invested in the country when
capital stays in the country. Nevertheless, capital owners may decide to remove their
capital from the country (called flee in Figure 2.1). The flight of capital is likewise
determined by the level of liberalization, θ. Following flight, the total capital invested in
the country is: (1−θ)K = (1−θ)(k+aθ). When capital markets are open, capital owners
are able to invest and disinvest more of their capital from the market. Capital invested
abroad receives an interest rate of rg, which is assumed to be less than the domestic
interest rate, as many authoritarian countries are capital scarce.
I assume that capital market liberalization increases the ability of capital to enter
and exit the market.6 As a result, liberalization in the model accounts for the removal of
numerous types of market restrictions, including reductions in inflow and outflow restric-
tions, as well as stable exchange rate policies and property rights enforcement, particularly
for investors. Although policymakers may independently manipulate these policies, they
often pursue packages of liberalization (e.g., Brune, Garrett and Kogut 2004, Simmons
and Elkins 2004, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006), and foreign investment and market
development only result when liberalization covers multiple dimensions for the following
reasons. Liberalizing capital inflows has little impact on markets without likewise lib-
eralizing outflows: capital entry is unattractive to foreign investors if they do not have
the flexibility to disinvest when they choose to do so. Policymakers then must facilitate
inflows and outflows if they want to deepen markets. Additionally, many policies, partic-
ularly exchange rate policies, bank regulation, legal institutions and shareholder rights,
affect both inflows and outflows. Capital market liberalization facilities capital entry and
exit.
The domestic interest rate when capital remains in the country is denoted: rs =
(1−β)lβ
(k+aθ)β
6I use the terms capital market liberalization, financial liberalization, and openness synonymously.
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and the domestic interest rate following flight is: rf =
(1−β)lβ
[(k+aθ)(1−θ)]β . It is also useful to
denote the domestic interest rate in the absence of openness: rd =
(1−β)lβ
kβ
. The wage
rate is affected by openness in a similar manner: ws =
β(k+aθ)1−β
l1−β , wf =
β[(k+aθ)(1−θ)]1−β
l1−β ,
and wd =
βk1−β
l1−β By definition, rf ≥ rs and rd ≥ rs, and ws ≥ wd and ws ≥ wf , as long
as θ ∈ [0, 1]. If the elite move their assets abroad, they have no way to constrain tax
rates in democracy (their threat of flight is gone), so the poor seize the elite’s remaining,
domestic assets following flight. Then, the utility of the elite following flight is: rgkθ
and the utility of the poor is: wf l + rfk(1 − θ). Recall that only (1 − θ) of the elite’s
assets remain in the country after flight and θ of the elite’s assets are invested abroad
and receive the global interest rate. Only elite income earned domestically is susceptible
to the government’s tax.
2.2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium, which is appropriate when
the game is infinitely repeated, involves numerous states, and includes endogenous tran-
sition probabilities. Although there is always one, unique equilibrium for a given set of
parameter values, there are three possible classes of equilibria that may result in this
model: (1) democracy, where the elite extend the franchise in the first round; (2) sta-
ble autocracy, where the elite use transfers to prevent revolution; and (3) revolutionary
autocracy, where the elite do not prevent revolution and the poor revolt. Each of these
classes may be further broken into specific outcomes depending on the amount of market
liberalization selected by the elite, which determines whether flight results in democracy
(even in the cases where democracy is not actually reached in equilibrium). Figure 2.2
provides a simplified graphical representation of the differences between the equilibria.
The figure presents all of the logically possible equilibria. I distinguish the equilibria us-
ing the discount factor (δ) and the probability of revolution success (ρ). I briefly sketch
each equilibrium below; the full proofs and definitions of the cut-points are available in
the appendix.
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Figure 2.2: All Possible Equilibria (values of τe, θ, τp in parentheses)
ρi ρiii ρiv ρvi ρvii ρviii
δ
δi
Stable
Autocracy
(0, 0, 1)
ρii
Revolution.
Autocracy
(0, 0, 1)
Stable
Autocracy
(0, θii, 1)
Stable
Autocracy
(0, θi, τ¯p)
Revolution.
Autocracy
(0, 1, τ¯p) Stable
Autocracy
(τ ∗e , 1, τ¯p)Revolution.
Autocracy
(0, 0, 1)
ρv
Constrained
Democracy
(0, 1, τ¯p)
Unconstrain.
Democracy
(0, 0, 1)
ρ
Note: the x-axis displays ρ, the probability of revolution success. The y-axis displays δ, the
discount factor. Parentheses denote policies as follows: (τe, θ, τp). The following inequalities
hold: 0 ≤ θii < θ¯ ≤ θi ≤ 1; 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. θ¯ is the minimum amount of openness that prompts τ¯p
in democracy, where τ¯p is the maximum tax rate that prevents elite flight. The figure provides
a simplified representation of all possible equilibria. The presence of each equilibrium and the
slope of the cut-points between them depend on parameter values.
There are two possible equilibrium outcomes where democracy results from the elite’s
voluntary extension of the franchise and democratization of the country: constrained
democracy and unconstrained democracy. In both outcomes, revolution is suffi-
ciently likely to be successful that the elite cannot credibly commit not to democratize
when the poor mobilize for revolution. Anticipating the elite’s democratization, the poor
mobilize. Knowing that democracy will result anyway, the elite provide no tax transfers
to the poor in the first and only period of autocracy. The main difference between the two
outcomes stems from the elite’s discount factor. Constrained democracy results when the
elite value future payoffs and open the capital market to protect their wealth in democ-
racy. Because the elite have liberalized, redistribution is limited, and the poor select the
highest tax rate that retains the elite investment in democracy (τp = τ¯p). Unconstrained
democracy results when the elite do not value future payoffs; they maximize their first
period payoff in autocracy and do not liberalize the capital market. Because they fail to
liberalize markets, the poor seize all of the elite’s income in democracy (τp = 1).
For the remaining equilibria to exist, the elite must be willing to ignore mobilization
by the poor. The elite are able to credibly ignore mobilization when ρ < ρvii and δ ≥ δi
or ρ < ρviii and δ < δi. These are necessary conditions to rule out constrained and
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unconstrained democracy. If the conditions are violated, the elite cannot credibly commit
not to democratize, so the poor always mobilize and democracy results. Figure 2.2
represents the most general case where it is assumed that a range of ρ’s exist between ρi
and ρviii. For any set of values, ρ and δ, only one equilibrium exists.
There are three possible stable autocracy outcomes. In these outcomes, the elite
pursue policies that prevent the poor from mobilizing for revolution, and democracy is
never reached in equilibrium. The main difference between them is the size of the trans-
fers necessary to prevent the poor from mobilizing. As the probability that revolution
is successful increases, the size of the transfers needed to prevent revolution likewise in-
creases. The elite prefer to use capital market liberalization over tax transfers to prevent
revolution, so they first exhaust liberalization before turning to tax transfers. Stable
autocracy without the threat of redistribution results when the amount of liberalization
necessary to prevent revolution (θi) is also sufficient to moderate the tax rate selected
by the poor in democracy (τp = τ¯p). Stable autocracy with the threat of redistribution
occurs when the amount of liberalization necessary to prevent revolution (θii) is not suffi-
cient to prevent expropriation in democracy (τp = 1), although democracy never actually
results in this equilibrium. Stable autocracy without transfers results when revolution is
so unlikely to be successful that the poor cannot credibly mobilize for revolution, and the
elite provide no transfers of any sort.
The final two revolutionary autocracy outcomes are marked by revolutions in
equilibrium. These are the types of autocracies where uprisings occur but are often
unsuccessful. Democracy is reached with some positive probability in these cases, but
democracy is always preceded by revolution. These outcomes result at intermediate
values of ρ, as revolutions must be sufficiently likely to be successful that the poor are
willing to mobilize for revolution and sufficiently unlikely to be successful that the elite
do not prevent the mobilization or extend the franchise. The main difference between
the two revolutionary outcomes is what happens when revolutions are successful and
democracy results. In revolutionary autocracy with the threat of redistribution, the elite
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do not liberalize the capital market. Consequently, the poor seize the elite’s income
(τp = 1) and the elite flee in democracy. In revolutionary autocracy without the threat of
redistribution, the elite liberalize the capital market. Because the flight threat is credible,
the poor select the highest tax rate that retains elite investment (τ¯p).
Chilean democracy during the early 1970’s serves as a powerful example of the redis-
tributive policies, feared by the elite, in unconstrained democracy. Salvador Allende
became president of Chile in 1970. When Allende became president, the state already
controlled over half of GDP and 75 percent of gross domestic investment (Roberts 1998,
111). Allende sought further nationalizations in copper and banking, and he pursued
widespread reform of land ownership (Roberts 1998, 92). Allende’s reforms were un-
popular among the economic elite, many of whom would later align themselves with the
military junta. These types of redistributive policies are precisely the costs that economic
elites associate with unconstrained democracy, and they provide a useful representation
of the fear of redistributive democracy in the model presented here.
In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet seized power in a military coup. Pinochet re-
mained in office until 1990, when he negotiated the transition to democracy after losing a
national plebiscite in 1988. During his years as head of the Chilean government, Pinochet
pursued a policy of “apertura,” or opening, which entailed complete liberalization of the
Chilean economy. Pinochet implemented Decree Law 600 in 1974, which aimed to in-
crease foreign capital inflows (Oppenheim 2006, 95) and guaranteed investors access to
the foreign exchange market. Figure 2.3 diagrams the dictatorship’s capital market poli-
cies using the Financial Reform Index (Adiad, Detragiache and Tressel 2008),7 and the
lending interest rate (World Bank 2013).8 Aggregate, time-series data reflects the liber-
alization of the financial market during the dictatorship.
Pinochet’s advisors sought to create an economic order that was so liberal and strong
that it would survive the creation of a new political order: “This was to be a ‘pro-
7The index details reductions in restrictions on the exchange rate, capital controls, banking sector,
and securities market and takes values between 0 and 21.
8Lower interest rates should indicate open and competitive markets.
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Figure 2.3: Financial Market Policy & Outcomes in Chile
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tected and authoritarian democracy’ with limited pluralism, under the guardianship of
the armed forces, that would continue to function once the military returned to their
barracks” (Huneeus 2007, 478). In other words, the liberalization laid the groundwork
for the constrained democracy that many scholars observe in Chile today. According
to one historian, “In Chile’s open, internationally integrated economy, the government’s
policy options are constrained by its dependence on foreign investment and the opportu-
nities for capital flight” (Roberts 1998, 153). Many scholars have lamented Chile’s lack
of redistributive policies in the decades following democratization. They point out that
the democratic government “never really tried to address the complex issue of the persis-
tent long-term disparities in income and wealth distribution” and that wealth continues
to be concentrated “in the hands of powerful and politically influential economic elites”
(Solimano 2012, 34). In fact, comparing income distributions between 1987 and 1998
show “that inequality has increased slightly since 1994” (Camhi et al. 2003, 110), and
one of the main causes of continued inequality is “the lack of more progressive taxation”
(Solimano 2012, 86). The policies of the democratic leaders of Chile are largely consistent
with the constrained democracy equilibrium presented here. The theory provides an
explanation for the persistently high level of inequality in Chile. The Chilean economy
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is intimately tied to the global economy, and Chile’s democratic leaders are constrained
by their need for investment.
General Suharto’s policy choices during his rule of Indonesia (1967-1998) exemplify
the benefits of market restrictions for political supporters, while at the same time il-
lustrating how market liberalization may stabilize an autocracy. Although Suharto
opened the capital account, he simultaneously maintained strict controls on foreign entry
into the banking sector and the financial market, particularly at the inception of his rule
(Hanson 2001, p. 237-239). These controls enabled him to provide preferential access
to financing and to channel other benefits to his political supporters (Vatikiotis 1998, p.
43-45). Over time, Suharto’s political strategy evolved to include: “a calculation that a
commitment to economic development could be an effective legitimating principle and at
the same time a source of support from many groups, including the military, the civilian
bureaucracy, and various groups in society” (Liddle 1991, p. 413). In 1988, Suharto
pursued “sweeping liberalization of banking regulations” (Vatikiotis 1998, 41), which was
part of a broad reform package aimed at attracting foreign financing. Figure 2.4 depicts
Suharto’s aggregate capital market policies using the Financial Reform Index (Adiad,
Detragiache and Tressel 2008). Because the lending interest rate is unavailable during
Suharto’s rule, the figure includes Indonesia’s GDP in billions of U.S. dollars (World Bank
2013). GDP and liberalization were closely associated in Indonesia. The figure also in-
cludes markers during the years that Indonesia was under an IMF program (Dreher 2006).
Suharto pursued market liberalization even in those years when IMF programs were not
in place. The unprecedented market openness and growth of Indonesia under Suharto
helped undermine support for political opponents and create a stable autocracy.
2.2.5 Model Insights
This section presents the model implications. Full proofs are in the Appendix. Lem-
mas provide intermediate findings of some interest, while propositions provide the core
insights from the model.
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Figure 2.4: Financial Market Policy & Outcomes in Indonesia
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Proposition 2.1. The probability of democratization is not monotonically increasing in
liberalization.
Although capital market openness is an effective way for the elite to protect their
wealth following democratization, democratization is not always more likely following
liberalization. In fact, liberalization may be used to stabilize autocracy. By stimulating
the economy and increasing wages for workers, liberalization makes revolution less at-
tractive to the poor. Proposition 2.1 is a particularly important result for the literature
on democratization. Previous theories have posited that democratization is more likely
when factors are mobile, which is augmented by open markets (Bates and Lien 1985,
Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Contrary to these existing theories, if the
people who own the wealth have power in autocracy, greater mobility will not increase
the probability of democratization. In fact, there are 34 different autocratic states with
fully liberalized capital markets.9 These open and stable autocracies include, at various
times: China, Djibouti, Jordan, Liberia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Uzbekistan and
many more. Proposition 2.1 provides insight into why autocrats maintain stable political
9Autocratic states are identified here as states with a polity score less than 6. Fully liberalized capital
markets have a Karcher and Steinberg (2013) value for capital account openness over 2.532, which is the
highest score in the full sample, including democracies and OECD countries.
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institutions while at the same time opening markets. Open markets may be used to
stimulate the economy, making revolution, which disrupts the economy, relatively more
costly and consolidating their rule.
Lemma 2.2. There are stable autocratic equilibria that sustain all levels of liberalization.
Lemma 2.2 helps explain why autocratic elites maintain variable levels of capital
market openness, even when liberalization increases competition and decreases the returns
to their wealth. The amount of liberalization in autocratic countries depends on the size
of the transfers necessary to prevent revolution. When larger transfers are needed, capital
markets should be more liberal and more developed.
Proposition 2.3. As long as the elite value their future payoffs sufficiently, financial lib-
eralization is weakly increasing in the probability of revolution success, whether democracy
results or not.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the logic of Proposition 2.3. The figure plots the equilibrium
amount of financial liberalization for each value of the probability of revolution success.
Even as the equilibrium changes, financial liberalization weakly increases in the proba-
bility of revolution success. The intuition for the finding is that market liberalization
is used for two different purposes. It may be used in autocracy to constrain tax rates
in anticipation of democratization or it may be used as a transfer to undermine the op-
position and preserve the current regime. For either purpose, however, liberalization is
increasing in the probability of revolution success. In autocracy, a higher likelihood of
revolution success results in a larger transfer being necessary to prevent the poor from
revolting. When the probability of revolution success is sufficiently high, the elite liberal-
ize capital markets, to prevent redistribution in democracy, and extend the franchise. As
long as the elite value their future payoffs, they always liberalize the market to prevent
redistribution, prior to democratization.
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium Value of Liberalization (for large δ)
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Note: δ is the actors’ discount factor; θ is the level of market liberalization;
ρ is the probability of revolutionary success.
Lemma 2.4. The equilibrium tax rate selected by the poor in constrained democracy is
decreasing in the level of capital market liberalization, the domestic capital endowment,
the amount of foreign capital seeking to enter the market and the global interest rate.
Lemma 2.4 is consistent with the literature on tax competition across countries (e.g.,
Oatley 1999, Basinger and Hallerberg 2004, Rudra 2008, Franzese and Hays 2008). When
the elite have the ability to move their assets abroad, through liberalized capital mar-
kets (θ), policymakers must offer a lower tax rate in order to retain investment. This
relationship is even more pronounced when foreign investment options are attractive, as
policymakers must make more concessions in order to attract or retain capital. Foreign
investment options are attractive in the model when the global interest rate (rg) is high.
Then, liberalized capital markets and attractive international investment options reduce
redistribution in democratic countries.
The results for the capital endowment (k) and the attractiveness of the market (a)
capture the fact that returns are lower in the country when capital is abundant. As
capital accumulates, through open capital markets and the attractiveness of the market,
the difference between the interest rate in the country if capital stays and the global
interest rate (rs − rg) decreases. In other words, the relative attractiveness of investing
elsewhere increases as the capital presence increases. Anything that makes investing
abroad more attractive for the elite forces the poor to implement more favorable tax
rates in order to retain investment in the democratic state. Further, when the capital
endowment is larger, liberalizing capital markets is less costly for the elite. Crucially, the
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elite never actually have to move their assets out of the country. The threat of flight is
sufficient to constrain tax rates.
Assumption 2.5. Reductions in elite income and increases in poor income decrease in-
equality, while increases in elite income and decreases in poor income increase inequality.
Assumption 2.5 is needed to derive results about inequality. In the model, the elite
derive their income from interest on their capital, while the poor derive their income
from payment for their labor and tax transfers from the elite. Consistent with the char-
acterization of the elite as capital owners and the poor as wage earners, this assumption
implies that the elite are wealthier than the poor and that reductions in elite income and
increases in poor income decrease inequality.
Proposition 2.6. In democracy, the effect of liberalization for inequality depends on
which of two income effects dominates. First, the elite’s income, in democracy, is always
increasing in liberalization. Second, the change in the poor’s income, in democracy, de-
pends on whether the effect of the wage increase or the reduction in tax transfer from
liberalization dominates. If the wage increase is sufficiently large, inequality decreases. If
the transfer decrease is sufficiently large, inequality increases.
Proposition 2.6 captures the fact that liberalization has countervailing effects in
democracy. It increases wages and decreases interest rates, while at the same time pro-
viding the elite with a credible exit option, which reduces the tax rate. In democracy, the
elite’s income is always increasing in liberalization, because they can move their assets
abroad, which forces the poor to reduce the tax rate. However, the effect on the poor’s
overall income depends on the relative increase in the wage rate versus the decrease in
tax transfers. If the decrease in tax transfers is larger than the increase in wages, then
the poor’s overall income decreases and inequality increases. If the increase in wages is
larger than the decrease in tax transfers, then whether inequality increases or decreases
will depend on whether the elite’s income is increasing at a faster rate than the poor’s
income. When the elite’s income is increasing at a faster rate, inequality increases. When
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the poor’s income is increasing at a faster rate, inequality decreases. The implications
of liberalization in autocracy are much more straightforward, although we will first need
the result in Lemma 2.7 to show them.
Lemma 2.7. Autocratic elites always prefer to use financial liberalization (θ) over taxes
(τe) as transfers.
Using capital market liberalization to buy the poor’s support and prevent revolution
is always preferable to using tax transfers for the elite. The intuition for this finding
is that the poor’s income increases more than the accompanying decrease in the elite’s
income from liberalization. The decrease in interest rates is mirrored by an increase in
wages and is attributable to the inflow of foreign capital: aθ. However, the decrease in
interest rates is spread across domestic and foreign capital owners (k + aθ), while the
increase in wages attributes entirely to the domestic labor force (l). In consequence, the
increase in wages from capital market development are larger than the decrease in interest
rates. This result is independent of the constraining impact of liberalization on tax rates
in democracy, which also makes liberalization attractive to the elite. Assumption 2.5 and
Lemma 2.7 are used to derive Proposition 2.8.
Proposition 2.8. In autocracy, liberalization reduces inequality in equilibrium.
The intuition for Proposition 2.8 is that capital market liberalization provides a trans-
fer from the elite to the poor in autocracy. Market development decreases the returns
to the elite by decreasing interest rates, and, at the same time, it increases the returns
to the poor by increasing wages. Since the elite are assumed to be wealthier than the
poor, this transfer reduces inequality. The empirical section will assess whether evidence
is consistent with Propositions 2.6 and 2.8.
2.3 Openness and Inequality
Propositions 2.6 and 2.8 provide novel implications for the effect of capital market
liberalization on inequality. The propositions yield the following hypotheses for empirical
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evaluation. Capital market liberalization has divergent consequences depending on regime
type. First, in autocracy, capital market liberalization acts as a transfer, increasing wages
and decreasing interest rates, and it thereby decreases inequality. Second, in democracy,
the effect of capital market liberalization on inequality is ambiguous. In democracy,
liberalization likewise serves as a transfer, but it also reduces the tax rate, by increasing
the mobility of capital. Because liberalization reduces the tax rate, it decreases inequality
at a slower rate in democracies, and it may even increase inequality relative to closed
democracies.
I use the following regression estimator with country fixed effects (vi), a linear time
trend (ut) and robust standard errors to evaluate the hypotheses:
Giniit = β0+β1Opennessit+β2Polityit+β3Opennessit∗Polityit+β4Controlsit+vi+ut+
(2.1)
The sample is limited to non-OECD countries, as the theory applies most directly to
capital scarce countries,10 and the sample includes 101 countries from 1978 to 2012. The
sample is described in Section 2.4.3 of the Appendix. Summary statistics are provided
in Table 4.1. The dependent variable is the Gini Index, which is a measure of inequality.
The Gini Index captures how much the income distribution in a country deviates from a
perfectly even income distribution (World Bank 2013). Larger values of the Gini Index
indicate more inequality.
The main variables of interest are market liberalization and regime type. I again use
the Karcher and Steinberg (2013) measure of capital account openness. I complement
this measure with two de facto measures of capital market liberalization: the interest
rate spread and the lending interest rate. Both interest rate measures come from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2013). The interest rate spread is the lending
interest rate minus the deposit rate, and competitive, open markets should have a smaller
spread. The lending interest rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers.
10The results are robust to the inclusion of all countries in the World Bank sample.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year 1999.59 7.33 1978 2012 809
Gini 42.62 10.33 19.4 74.33 809
Log GDP per capita 7.49 1.02 4.84 10.86 783
GDP Growth 4.2 5.09 -29.1 37.48 788
IMF Program 0.51 0.69 0 4 757
Polity 13.96 5.88 0 20 749
Interest Rate Spread 10.95 14.19 -165.06 166.19 644
Lending Interest Rate 23.56 20.89 5.04 213.02 660
Openness 0.14 1.56 -1.76 2.53 542
Figure 2.6: Marginal Effect of Liberalization on Inequality
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In a more open financial market, one expects lower rates. The interest rate is particularly
useful here, as it captures the effect of liberalization in the model, which decreases interest
rates. Previous studies have also used interest rates as a proxy for market liberalization
(e.g., Fry 1997, Bandiera et al. 2000).
The de facto measures of liberalization are particularly attractive, because leaders
may restrict capital markets in infinitely many ways, making de jure measures difficult
to estimate. The de facto measures also capture the intermediate effect of liberalization
hypothesized here: reductions in interest rates. Even seemingly all-encompassing mea-
sures of capital market liberalization (Karcher and Steinberg 2013, Chinn and Ito 2008,
Quinn and Incla´n 1997, Quinn 1997) cannot capture every way that leaders limit access
to capital markets. For example, leaders may enact discriminatory legal provisions, pro-
vide preferential regulation to their political supporters or engage in all sorts of corrupt
practices.11 Many studies have attempted to evaluate the impact of liberalization on in-
equality using conventional measures on liberalization, but most have found null results
(e.g., Reuveny and Li 2003, Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou 2008). Furthermore, capital
market liberalization likely only leads to market development in the presence of property
rights (Chinn and Ito 2006, Broner and Ventura 2010). The theory presented here is
concerned with a liberalizing package of reforms, which lead to capital inflows, market
development, increased wages, reduced interest rates, and increased capital mobility.
The Polity data again captures regime type (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2013). To
facilitate interpretation of the interactive and constitutive terms in the estimator, I trans-
form the polity variable to cover 0 to +20 with higher values indicating more democratic
countries. After the transformation, the coefficient on each capital market liberalization
measure captures the effect of liberalization in a fully autocratic country. I include con-
trols for log GDP per capita (in thousands of dollars) in the country and GDP growth
(World Bank 2013), as modernization could be related to democratization (e.g., Lipset
11See Claessens and Perotti (2007) for a discussion of the limit of existing analyses and the impact of
various types of restrictions and Pepinsky (2013) for a discussion of when different restrictions might be
politically attractive.
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1959, Doorenspleet 2004) and openness. I also control for whether a country is under an
IMF loan in each country year (Dreher 2006), as the IMF often encourages countries to
open their markets.
When liberalization is measured using the interest rate variables, I expect higher in-
terest rates to be associated with higher inequality in autocracy (β1 should be positive),
but the effect should become smaller and even begin to decrease inequality as the regime
type becomes more democratic (β3 negative). β1 captures the effect of liberalizing capital
markets when the government is authoritarian (β3 drops out when polity is 0). Alter-
natively, when liberalization is measured using the openness variable the signs on the
coefficients should flip: I expect openness to decrease inequality in the most autocratic
countries (β1 should be negative), but the effect should become smaller and even begin to
increase inequality as the regime type becomes more democratic (β3 positive). I expect
inequality to be lower in authoritarian countries with open markets, measured here by
lower interest rates and greater openness. The reduction in inequality in autocracy is
driven by the impact of market liberalization on factor returns: wages increase and the
returns to investment decrease when developing markets are liberalized. Conversely, as
countries become more democratic, liberalization reduces income redistribution through
tax transfers and may actually increase inequality.
The results in Table 2.2 are consistent with my expectations, and they are significant
at conventional levels when using the interest rate measures.12 Liberalization in autoc-
racy is negatively correlated with inequality, and the relationship is moderated by polity.
As polity and openness increase, inequality increases. The lack of significance using the
capital account measure is unsurprising, as there are many ways that policymakers re-
strict openness, which are not captured using the capital account measure. Columns (1),
(3), and (5) represent the most parsimonious estimates; columns (2), (4), and (6) include
controls. Figure 2.6 plots the marginal effect of liberalization on inequality in the esti-
12Estimates are robust to the exclusion of country fixed effects and to the inclusion of a lagged depen-
dent variable, although the sample size is dramatically reduced by the dynamic specification.
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Market Development on Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lending Interest Rate 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(2.66) (2.44)
Interest Rate Spread 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(2.49) (2.14)
Openness -0.43 -0.43
(-0.99) (-0.98)
Polity 0.16 0.15 0.094 0.085 -0.0013 0.0080
(1.65) (1.41) (1.12) (0.95) (-0.02) (0.10)
Lending Interest Rate * Polity -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0063∗∗∗
(-2.73) (-2.74)
Interest Rate Spread * Polity -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(-2.33) (-2.20)
Openness * Polity 0.038 0.036
(1.33) (1.23)
Log GDP per capita 1.08 0.97 1.76
(0.42) (0.35) (0.63)
GDP Growth -0.057 -0.047 -0.086
(-1.43) (-1.16) (-1.55)
IMF Program 0.066 0.096 0.15
(0.20) (0.28) (0.46)
Constant -179.4∗ -119.0 -176.8∗ -127.8 -184.7 -74.6
(-1.69) (-0.85) (-1.72) (-0.81) (-1.47) (-0.58)
N 620 567 605 555 519 475
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample is restricted to non-OECD.
Estimators include country fixed effects, a linear time trend, and robust standard errors.
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mates with controls (columns (2) and (6)). The left panel uses capital account openness
as the measure of liberalization and the line slopes upward, as increased liberalization in
more democratic countries is not associated with as large a decrease in inequality as it is
in autocratic countries. The right panel uses the lending interest rate as the measure of
liberalization and the line slopes downward, as increased liberalization reduces interest
rates.13 Then, a reduction in liberalization is associated with an increase in inequality in
autocratic countries, and the effect diminishes as countries become more democratic.
2.3.1 Conclusion
Many scholars fear that the constraining power of international capital flows under-
mines democratic policy (e.g., Block 1977, Lindblom 1977, Stopford, Strange and Henley
1991, Roberts 1998, Oman 2000). According to their theories, policymakers are unable
to select the policies preferred by their constituents when those policies would lead to
underinvestment or even capital flight (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988). This chapter
presents a more optimistic picture of the stability of democratic institutions: precisely
because redistribution is constrained by capital flows, the economic elite do not need to
reverse democratic institutions and directly exercise political power in autocracy. Rather,
the constraining power of capital means that economic elites obtain policies that they
find acceptable in democracy. Without capital mobility, democracy would produce redis-
tribution, creating pressure from economic elites for the reversal of democracy.
The implications of the game theoretic model presented here run in direct contra-
diction to the conventional wisdom about capital mobility and democratization. The
conventional wisdom, often framed around the development of democracy in Western
Europe, is that limited government results when rulers must trade policy and institu-
tional concessions in exchange for tax revenue (Bates and Lien 1985, North and Weingast
1989, Boix 2003, Ansell and Samuels 2010). Mobile assets are particularly hard to tax,
providing the owners of mobile assets with more policy control, and greater asset mobil-
13The plot of the interest rate spread is excluded as it is similar to the lending interest rate plot.
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ity leads to more democratization. This argument only holds when the economic elite
are not also the political elite. However, because autocrats manipulate policy to enrich
themselves and their political supporters, the political elite are often the economic elite
in modern autocracies. When the political elite are the economic elite in autocracy, de-
mocratization may result when capital is mobile, not because capital owners demand it,
rather because the autocratic elite no longer need political power. They exercise influence
through the mobility of their investments. Furthermore, it is not certain that democracy
will result from openness: The autocratic elite may use liberalization to weaken the
political opposition and preserve the autocracy.
In exploring the effects of capital openness for regime change, the model resolves
several existing puzzles. First, high inequality and the seeming absence of redistributive
pressure in many democracies have long puzzled scholars (Bonica et al. 2013, Haggard and
Kaufman 2012, Kaufman 2009). As long as the median voter earns less than the mean in-
come, policymakers in democracy should prefer more redistribution than policymakers in
autocracy (Meltzer and Richard 1981, Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). However, inequal-
ity persists in many democracies (Albertus and Menaldo 2013). This chapter suggests
that democratization occurs when the elite have found ways to stymie its effects: They
liberalize capital markets, making their threat of capital flight credible and preventing
the new democratic leaders from pursuing redistributive policies.
The theory provides insight into a second puzzle: why doesn’t capital market liber-
alization decrease inequality? Theoretically, one would expect liberalization to lead to
lower inequality, particularly in developing countries, where liberalization should trig-
ger capital inflows, which decrease interest rates and raise wages. Previous studies have
found no relationship between capital market liberalization and inequality, even when
they parse out developed from developing countries (Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou
2008), and others find that liberalization and investment may actually increase inequality
(Reuveny and Li 2003). There are many potential reasons for null results: wages might
increase the most for skilled workers, which could increase inequality, or the measures of
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liberalization might not actually capture significant amounts of protection that are not
based on capital account restrictions, including weak legal institutions, foreign entry or
ownership restrictions, or corruption (Pepinsky 2013, Claessens and Perotti 2007).
The theory presented here shows that liberalization could in fact decrease inequality
through it’s impact on interest rates and wages and still produce results that are indeter-
minate or even inconsistent with the theoretical intuition. Previous studies have failed
to consider that the implications of liberalization might be different under different po-
litical regimes. According to the theory, liberalization decreases tax rates in democracy,
thereby limiting redistribution, which in turn increases inequality. In order to evaluate
the impact of liberalization, scholars must consider the political institutions in the coun-
try of interest. A simple cross-national time series analysis of Gini coefficients, polity and
interest rates provides evidence that is consistent with the theory, although future work
should assess the robustness of the results.
The theory helps address a third puzzle: why do leaders in authoritarian countries
ever liberalize financial markets? Leaders in democracies, who must appeal to a large
group of voters, are more likely to invest in pro-growth, public good type policies than
leaders in autocracies who favor their relatively small group of supporters (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003, Lake and Baum 2001). The liberalization and development of
financial markets is often associated with economic growth (Rajan and Zingales 2003,
La Porta et al. 2000). Thus, democratic leaders should be more likely than autocratic
leaders to liberalize capital markets. While they are, some autocratic leaders liberalize
capital markets prior to and even absent democratization.
Previous studies have relied on variation in the size of the winning coalition in autoc-
racies to explain autocratic liberalization (Clark, Poast and Flores 2010, Steinberg and
Malhotra 2014). The model here abstracts from the size of the winning coalition and
instead examines the effect of pressure from groups who have no institutional author-
ity. Through their revolutionary threat, the poor may extract concessions in autocracy
and may even trigger democratization. The theory explains those cases of liberalization
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where the winning coalition is small, even by autocratic standards. Autocrats pursue the
liberalization of financial markets for two reasons. First, liberalization may provide an
efficient way to increase the income of the poor, make revolution more costly, and thereby
preserve the autocracy. Second, because liberalization constrains tax rates in democracy,
autocrats may liberalize the market in anticipation of democratization, when preventing
democratization is prohibitively costly. The second mechanism is largely complementary
to existing arguments that autocrats create political institutions to protect their influ-
ence (Baldez and Carey 1999, Carey 2002, Albertus and Menaldo 2013). Liberalization,
however, enables economic elites to retain policy influence even without political power.
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2.4 Appendix
2.4.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof. Proposition 2.1. By contradiction. Assume the probability of democratization
is increasing in capital market liberalization. In a stable autocratic equilibrium capi-
tal markets are open, and the probability of democratization is zero. In unconstrained
democracy and revolutionary autocracy with the threat of redistribution, capital markets
are closed and democracy results with positive probability. Thus, capital markets may
be more liberalized in an equilibrium where the probability of democratization is zero
than in an equilibrium where the probability of democratization is positive. This is a
contradiction.
Proof. Lemma 2.2. In the stable autocracy equilibria, θ increases with ρ, and covers the
range of θ ∈ [0, 1]. See Proposition 2.3 for the full proof that θ increases in ρ.
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Proof. Proposition 2.3. For low values of ρ, stable autocracy without transfers results
and θ = 0. As ρ increases, the size of the transfers needed to prevent revolution and,
therefore, θ, increases: first to θii, then to θi, and, finally, to 1. θii is increasing in ρ: Using
the Implicit Function Theorem, we know: dθ
ii
dρ
= −∂G(θii,ρ)
∂(ρ)
/(∂G(θ
ii,ρ)
∂θii
). θii is implicitly
defined by the following equation: G = −δcp(1−ρ)+δ2ρ(rfk(1−θ)+wf l)−wsl(1+δ+δ2ρ)
(Equation 2.10 in the Appendix). ∂G(θ
ii,ρ)
∂θii
is negative, and ∂G(θ
ii,ρ)
∂(ρ)
is positive, as long as
rfk(1− θ) +wf l−wsl ≥ 0. This condition holds in the stable autocracy with the threat
of redistribution equilibrium; otherwise, the poor would be unwilling to revolt and the
elite would provide no transfers. θi is increasing in ρ: Again using the Implicit Function
Theorem, we have: dθ
i
dρ
= −∂F (θi,ρ)
∂(ρ)
/(∂F (θ
i,ρ)
∂θi
). θi is implicitly defined by the following
equation: F = −(wsl + τersk)(1 + δ)− δcp(1− δ) + δ2ρ(τprsk − τersk) (Equation 2.14 in
the Appendix). ∂F (θ
i,ρ)
∂θi
is always negative, and ∂F (θ
i,ρ)
∂(ρ)
is positive, so θi is increasing in ρ
(θ only varies when τe = 0, so those terms drop out). As ρ increases and stable autocracy
is no longer possible, θ is always set to one in equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma 2.4. Take the derivative of τ¯p =
(1−β)lβ−θrg(k+aθ)β
(1−β)lβ with respect to θ, k, a
and rg.
Proof. Proposition 2.6. The elite’s income in democracy is always: θrg, so their income
increases in θ.14 The poor’s income in democracy depends on whether the elite stay or
flee. If the elite stay, the poor’s income is: rsk − θrg + wsl, which may be rewritten as:
(1−β)klβ
(k+aθ)β
−θkrg+β(k+aθ)1−βlβ. Then, the effect of θ is: ∂Up∂θ = −aβ(1−β)kl
β
(k+aθ)1+β
−rgk+ aβ(1−β)lβ(k+aθ)β .
The first two terms capture the reduction in the tax transfer, while the third term captures
the increase in wages due to an increase in openness. If the elite flee, the poor’s income is:
rfk(1−θ)+wf l, which may be rewritten as: (1−β)k(1−θ)1−β lβ(k+aθ)β +β[(k+aθ)(1−θ)]1−βlβ. The
effect of θ is: ∂Up
∂θ
= − (1−β)2klβ
[(k+aθ)(1−θ)]β − aβ(1−β)k(1−θ)
1−β lβ
(k+aθ)1+β
+ aβ(1−β)(1−θ)
1−β lβ
(k+aθ)β
− β(1−β)(k+aθ)1−β lβ
(1−θ)β .
The first two terms capture the effect of θ on the transfer, while the third and fourth
terms capture the effect of θ on wages. The total effect is ambiguous.
14The elite may only guarantee themselves θrg through flight, and, even if they do not flee, the poor
make the elite indifferent between flight and stay, so their expected payoff is nonetheless θrg.
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Proof. Lemma 2.7. The price, marginal cost over marginal benefit, to the elite of using
τe as a transfer is: 1. The price of using θ as a transfer is:
k
k+aθ
. The price of θ is less
than the price of taxes. See Equation 2.9 in the Appendix.
Proof. Proposition 2.8. The elite’s income in autocracy, (1− τe) (1−β)lβ(k+aθ)β k, is decreasing
in θ. The poor’s income in autocracy, βlβ(k+ aθ)1−β + τe
(1−β)lβ
(k+aθ)β
k, is weakly increasing in
θ in equilibrium (recall that τe = 0 in all autocratic equilibria, unless θ = 1 is insufficient
to deter the poor from revolting; then, the elite will use both θ and τe). Whenever θ
varies in equilibrium, increases in θ always transfer wealth from the elite to the poor.
2.4.2 Equilibria Proofs
2.4.2.1 Constrained Democracy
In the constrained democracy equilibrium, the elite select: τe = 0, θ = 1 and democra-
tize in autocracy. The poor mobilize in autocracy. In democracy, the poor select τp = τ¯p.
The elite stay as long as τp ≤ τ¯p. Constrained democracy results when δ ≥ (k+a)β−kβ(k+a)β−kβτp
and ρ ≥ k(1−β)lβ [τp(1+δ)−1]−ce(k+a)β
k(1−β)lβτpδ .
Proof. Check for profitable deviations.
In democracy, the elite prefer to stay as long as their value function for stay is at
least as large as their value function for flee: V De (stay) ≥ V De (flee)⇐⇒ (1−τp)rsk1−δ ≥ θkrg1−δ
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor. The poor would always want to make the tax rate
as high as possible so the elite’s incentive compatibility constraint is met with equality.
I define τ¯p as the maximum tax rate that is incentive compatible with stay for the elite.
Simplifying the equation reveals:
τ¯p =
(1− β)lβ − θrg(k + aθ)β
(1− β)lβ (2.2)
θ = 1 in this equilibrium, so this may be simplified to: τ¯p =
(1−β)lβ−rg(k+a)β
(1−β)lβ . In equilib-
rium, τp = τ¯p, so elite stay is the best response.
In democracy, the poor select the tax rate. The poor’s utility is increasing in the
tax rate, but he must consider the elite’s response to his tax. If the poor select τp = 1,
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the elite flee. If the poor select τp = τ¯p, the elite stay. The poor’s value function for
τp = τ¯p must be at least as large as his value function for τp = 1: V
D
p (τ¯p) ≥ V Dp (1) ⇐⇒
rskτ¯p+wsl
1−δ ≥
rfk(1−θ)+wf l
1−δ . Because θ = 1 in this equilibrium, the inequality always holds
(recall that wf ≤ ws and τ¯p ≥ 0).
In autocracy, the elite must prefer to play democratize in response to mobilization:
V Ae (democratize)
≥ V Ae (ignore) ⇐⇒ rsk + δrsk(1−τp)1−δ ≥ rsk(1−δ)−ceδ(1−δ)+ρ(1−τp)rskδ
2
(1−δ2(1−ρ))(1−δ) . Simplification reveals
the following inequality:
ρ ≥ k(1− β)l
β [τp(1 + δ)− 1]− ce(k + a)β
k(1− β)lβτpδ (2.3)
In autocracy, the poor would not deviate from mobilization for revolution. Their
value for mobilizing for revolution is: V Ap (mobilize) = wsl + δ
[
rskτp+wsl
1−δ
]
. Their value
for conceding is: V Ap (concede) =
wsl
1−δ . Because τp is greater than zero in equilibrium,
V Ap (mobilize) is always greater than V
A
p (concede).
In autocracy, the elite would always play τe = 0 when they are going to democratize.
τe does not affect their future payoffs or transition probabilities, so there is no reason to
transfer any income to the poor.
The elite’s selection of θ depends on his discount factor. In democracy, the poor
will select τp to make the elite indifferent between stay and flee, so the elite’s expected
income in democracy will be: θrgk. Thus, the elite’s income is always increasing in
θ in democracy. In autocracy, the elite’s income is always decreasing in θ, where the
elite’s expected income is: (1−β)l
βk
(k+aθ)β
. Therefore, if the elite care a sufficient amount about
their income in democracy, they select θ = 1. If the elite do not value future payoffs in
democracy, they select θ = 0.
The incentive compatibility condition for the elite to select θ = 1 is therefore: V Ae (1) ≥
V Ae (0)⇐⇒ rsk + δ
[
(1−τp)rsk
1−δ
]
≥ rdk. Further simplification reveals:
δ ≥ (k + a)
β − kβ
(k + a)β − kβ τ¯p (2.4)
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Equations 2.3 and 2.4 must be met for constrained democracy.
2.4.2.2 Unconstrained Democracy
In the unconstrained democracy equilibrium, the elite make no transfers to the poor:
τe, θ = 0 and they democratize in autocracy. The poor mobilize for revolution in autoc-
racy. In democracy, the poor select τp = 1 and the elite flee. This equilibrium results
when: δ < (k+a)
β−kβ
(k+a)β−kβτp and ρ ≥
(1−β)lβk1−βδ−ce
(1−β)lβk1−βδ .
Proof. In democracy, the elite flees, because τp = 1 is larger than τ¯p (see equation 2.2
above).
In order for the poor to select τp = 1: V
D
p (1) ≥ V Dp (τ¯p)⇐⇒ rdk(1−θ)+wdl1−δ ≥ rsk(1−τ¯p)+wsl1−δ .
Recall that θ = 0, so rd = rs and wd = ws, and that τ¯p > 0. Then the inequality always
holds.
In autocracy, the elite must be willing to democratize: V Ae (democratize) ≥ V Ae (ignore)⇐⇒
rdk ≥ rdk−δce1−δ2(1−ρ) . Simplification reveals:
ρ ≥ (1− β)l
βk1−βδ − ce
(1− β)lβk1−βδ (2.5)
The poor mobilize if their value from mobilization is larger than their value from
concede:
V Ap (mobilize) ≥ V Ap (concede) ⇐⇒ wdl + δ(wdl+rdk)1−δ ≥ wdl1−δ . The inequality always holds;
as long as the elite will democratize, the poor will mobilize.
The elite never make a tax transfer in autocracy knowing that they will democratize
later in the game, therefore: τe = 0. To incentivize θ = 0, the following incentive
compatibility constraint must hold: V Ae (0) ≥ V Ae (1), which may be simplified in the
following way:
δ <
(k + a)β − kβ
(k + a)β − kβτp (2.6)
Equations 2.5 and 2.6 must hold for unconstrained democracy.
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2.4.2.3 Stable Autocracy with the Threat of Redistribution
The stable autocracy with threat of redistribution equilibrium occurs when the elite
select a low level of capital market liberalization, θ = θii, and no tax transfers to purchase
the poor’s support, τe = 0; as well as ignore in autocracy. The poor concede as long as θ ≥
θii. In democracy, which is not reached in equilibrium, the poor select τp = 1 and the elite
flee. This equilibrium holds when θii < θ¯ and
(1−δ)(k+aθ)β[(1−β)lβk1−β−ceδ]−(1−β)lβk(1−δ2)
(1−β)lβkδ2 ≤
ρ ≤ (1−β)lβk(1−δ)−rgk(k+aθ)βθ−ce(k+aθ)β(1−δ)
(1−β)lβkδ(1−δ)−rgk(k+aθ)βθδ(1−δ) .
Proof. In democracy, the elite flee, as the poor select τp = 1 which is greater than τ¯p.
The poor select τp = 1 when: V
D
p (1) ≥ V Dp (τ¯p)⇐⇒ rfk(1−θ)+wf l1−δ ≥ rsk(1−τ¯p)+wsl1−δ , which
may be rewritten as:
0 ≥ (1− β)lβk(1− τ¯p − (1− θ)1−β) + βlβ(k + aθ)(1− (1− θ)1−β) (2.7)
When θ = 0, the inequality holds. When θ = 1, it does not hold. As θ increases, the
equation becomes less likely to hold. I define the maximum amount of liberalization that
still triggers capital flight as θ¯. θ¯ is implicitly defined by equation 2.7 when it is met
with equality. The first requirement for this equilibrium is that the necessary amount of
transfers, θii, that prevent mobilization are less than θ¯.
In autocracy, the elite must ignore poor mobilization: V Ae (ignore) ≥ V Ae (democratize)⇐⇒
(rsk−δce)(1−δ)+δ2ρrgkθ
(1−δ)(1−(1−ρ)δ2) ≥ rsk + δrgkθ(1−δ) , which may be rewritten as:
ρ ≤ (1− β)l
βk(1− δ)− rgk(k + aθ)βθ − ce(k + aθ)β(1− δ)
(1− β)lβkδ(1− δ)− rgk(k + aθ)βθδ(1− δ) (2.8)
The elite will make a transfer to the poor that incentives the poor to concede:
V Ap (concede) ≥ V Ap (mobilize). Before turning to this constraint, we evaluate how that
transfer would be made. The poor will always prefer to use θ to make this transfer
rather than τe. The price of τe can be thought of as the marginal cost divided by the
marginal benefit of an increase in τe. Both are linear, so the price of increasing τe is
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1. The marginal cost of increasing θ is the decrease in income accruing to the elite:
∂rsk
∂θ
= −β(1−β)l
βak
(k+aθ)1+β
. The marginal benefit of increasing θ is the increase in income accru-
ing to the poor: ∂wsl
∂θ
= β(1−β)al
β
(k+aθ)β
. The price is again the cost divided by the benefit. The
price of increasing θ is: k
k+aθ
. As long as θ ≥ 0, increases in θ are cheaper than increases
in τe:
k
k + aθ
≤ 1 (2.9)
In this equilibrium, the transfers are sufficiently small that the elite use only capital
market openness, τe = 0, and the level of openness is insufficient to prevent flight in
equilibrium, θii < θ¯.15
Now, we can return to the constraint: V Ap (concede) ≥ V Ap (mobilize)⇐⇒
wsl
1−δ ≥
(wsl−δcp)(1−δ)+δ2ρ(rfk(1−θ)+wf l)
(1−δ)(1−δ2(1−ρ)) . Simplification yields:
cp(1−δ)(k+aθ)β ≥ δρlβ(1−θ)1−β [(1− β)k + β(k + aθ)]−βlβ(k+aθ)(1−δ(1−ρ)) (2.10)
When equation 2.10 is met with equality, it implicitly identifies the level of transfers
necessary to prevent the poor from mobilizing for revolution. Equation 2.10 is always met
when θ = 1 and may be but is not necessarily met when θ = 0. The elite will not transfer
more than necessary, so equation 2.10 binds. I call the necessary level of transfers θii. θii
is defined by equation 2.10 when it is met with equality.
The transfers, θii, must be incentive compatible for the elite: V Ae (0, θ
ii) ≥ V Ae (0, 0)⇐⇒
rsk
1−δ ≥ rdk−δce1−δ2(1−ρ) . Simplification yields:
ρ ≥ (1− δ)(k + aθ)
β
[
(1− β)lβk1−β − ceδ
]− (1− β)lβk(1− δ2)
(1− β)lβkδ2 (2.11)
15I next turn to the equilibrium where openness is sufficient to prevent flight in the state of democ-
ratization. Although democratization never results in stable autocracy, expected payoffs in democracy
affect transfers in autocracy.
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2.4.2.4 Stable Autocracy without the Threat of Redistribution
In the stable autocracy without the threat of redistribution equilibrium, the elite
select τ ∗e , θ
i and ignore in autocracy. The poor concede as long as τe ≥ τ ∗e and θ ≥ θi
in autocracy. In democracy, the poor select τ¯p and the elite stay. Stable autocracy
without the threat of redistribution results when the following conditions hold: ρ ≥
(1−δ)[(1−β)lβk(k+aθ)β−ceδ(k+a)β(k+aθ)β−(1−τe)(1−β)lβk(k+a)β(1+δ)]
δ2(1−β)lβk[(1−τe)(k+a)β−(1−τp)(k+aθ)β ] ,
ρ ≥ (1−δ)[(1−β)lβk1−β(k+aθ)β−ce(k+aθ)βδ−(1−τe)(1−β)lβk(1+δ)]
(1−τe)(1−β)lβkδ2 , ρ ≤
(1−β)lβk[τp(1+δ)−1−τeδ]−ce(k+aθ)β
(1−β)lβkδ[τp−τe] ,
and θi ∈ [θ¯, 1].
Proof. In democracy, the highest tax rate the poor can select and still retain investment
makes the elite indifferent between stay and flee: V De (stay) = V
D
e (flee) ⇐⇒ (1−τp)krs1−δ =
θkrg
1−δ . Substitution reveals:
τ¯p =
(1− β)lβ − θrg(k + aθ)β
(1− β)lβ (2.12)
This is the optimal τp for the poor when θ is sufficiently large to prevent τp = 1. I now
solve for that sufficient level of θ.
The poor’s value function for τp = τ¯p must be at least as large as his value function
for τp = 1: V
D
p (τ¯p) ≥ V Dp (1) ⇐⇒ rskτ¯p+wsl1−δ ≥
rfk(1−θ)+wf l
1−δ . Recall that θ¯ makes the poor
indifferent between τp = 1 and τp = τ¯p. Thus, in this equilibrium, the amount of capital
market liberalization necessary to buy the poor’s support is: θi ∈ [θ¯, 1] and the poor
always select τ¯p.
16 Because θ is a less expensive source of transfers than τe (see equation
2.9), τe is only used when θ = 1 is insufficient to prevent mobilization.
In autocracy, the elite must be willing to ignore mobilizations made by the poor:
V Ae (ignore) ≥ V Ae (democratize) ⇐⇒ rsk(1−τe)(1−δ)−δce(1−δ)+δ
2ρrsk(1−τp)
(1−δ)(1−(1−ρ)δ2) ≥ rsk(1 − τe) +
δrsk(1−τp)
(1−δ) . Simplification yields:
ρ ≤ (1− β)l
βk [τp(1 + δ)− 1− τeδ]− ce(k + aθ)β
(1− β)lβkδ [τp − τe] (2.13)
16In the previous equilibrium, I solved for the case where θ ∈ [0, θ¯].
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Equation 2.13 is a more general version of the cut point in equation 2.3.
The elite will not provide more transfers to the poor than are necessary to prevent
mobilization, which means the elite make the poor indifferent between mobilize and
concede: V Ap (concede) = V
A
p (mobilize) ⇐⇒ wsl+τersk1−δ = (wsl+τersk−δcp)(1−δ)+δ
2ρ(wsl+τprsk)
(1−δ)(1−δ2(1−ρ)) .
There are two possible cases. Recall that τe is only used when θ is exhausted. The first
case occurs when θ ∈ [θ¯, 1] is sufficient to prevent mobilization. The second case occurs
when θ = 1 is insufficient to prevent mobilization and τe must be used as well.
In the first case, V Ap (concede) ≥ V Ap (mobilize) is met using exclusively θ (τe = 0). In
this case, the necessary θ, which I call θi, is defined by the following equation met with
equality:
β(k + aθi)lβ(1− δ) ≥ δρk[(1− β)lβ − θirg(k + aθi)β]− cp(1− δ)(k + aθi)β (2.14)
Note, that as θ increases, the left hand side gets larger and the right hand side gets
smaller. If θ = 1 and the inequality still isn’t met, then the elite would need to use taxes
and capital market liberalization in order to prevent democratization.
I now turn to the second case where the elite must use θ = 1 and τe > 0. I solve for
τe in the incentive compatibility condition (V
A
p (concede) = V
A
p (mobilize)) above:
τe =
ρ(1− β)klβδ − β(k + a)lβ(1− δ)− cp(k + a)β(1− δ)− ρδkrg(k + a)β
(1− β)lβk(1− δ(1− ρ)) (2.15)
Equation 2.15 identifies the level of transfers necessary to prevent the poor from
mobilizing; I call these transfers τ ∗e .
τ ∗e and θ
i must be incentive compatible for the elite. The first possible deviation would
be to make no transfer at all knowing that the poor will then mobilize for revolution:
V Ae (0, 0) =
rdk−ceδ
1−δ2(1−ρ) . The elite’s value of following the equilibrium is: V
A
e (τ
∗
e , θ
i) =
(1−τ∗e )rsk
1−δ . Then, τ
∗
e and θ
i are incentive compatible for the elite when:
ρ ≥
(1− δ)
[
(1− β)lβk1−β(k + aθ)β − ce(k + aθ)βδ − (1− τe)(1− β)lβk(1 + δ)
]
(1− τe)(1− β)lβkδ2 (2.16)
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Another possibility is that the elite deviate to τe = 0 and θ = 1. If the elite were to
deviate, the poor would mobilize for revolution (if the poor concedes then either τ ∗e = 0
and θi = 1 or the elite would want to make the allocations τ ∗e and θ
i as those allocations
maximize his utility). τ ∗e , θ
i must be incentive compatible: V Ae (τ
∗
e , θ
i) ≥ V Ae (0, 1) ⇐⇒
(1−τ∗e )rs(θi)k
1−δ ≥ (rs(1)k−δce)(1−δ)+δ
2ρ(1−τp)rs(1)k
(1−δ)(1−δ2(1−ρ)) . The elite’s value of following the equilibrium
is. Simplification yields the following incentive compatibility constraint:
ρ ≥
(1− δ)
[
(1− β)lβk(k + aθ)β − ceδ(k + a)β(k + aθ)β − (1− τe)(1− β)lβk(k + a)β(1 + δ)
]
δ2(1− β)lβk
[
(1− τe)(k + a)β − (1− τp)(k + aθ)β
]
(2.17)
2.4.2.5 Revolutionary Autocracy with the Threat of Redistribution
In the revolutionary autocracy with threat of redistribution equilibrium, the elite
select τe, θ = 0 and ignore in autocracy. The poor choose to mobilize for revolution
in autocracy. In democracy, the poor select τp = 1 and the elite flee. When the fol-
lowing conditions are met, autocracy without liberalization results: δ < (k+a)
β−kβ
(k+a)β−kβτp ,
(1−δ)(βlβk1−β+cp)
δ(1−β)lβk1−β ≤ ρ ≤ δ(1−β)l
βk1−β−ce
δ(1−β)lβk1−β , and
ρ ≤ (1−δ)[(1−β)lβk1−β(k+aθ)β−ceδ(k+aθ)β−(1−β)lβk(1+δ)]
(1−β)lβkδ2 .
Proof. In democracy, the poor play τp = 1 and the elite flee. τp = 1 is incentive compat-
ible, because θ = 0.
In autocracy, ignoring the poor’s mobilization must be incentive compatible for the
elite: V Ae (ignore) ≥ V Ae (democratize) ⇐⇒ rdk−δce1−δ2(1−ρ) ≥ rdk. Therefore, the following
inequality must hold:
ρ ≤ δ(1− β)l
βk1−β − ce
δ(1− β)lβk1−β (2.18)
The poor must be willing to mobilize: V Ap (mobilize) ≥ V Ap (concede)⇐⇒
wdl(1−δ)−cpδ(1−δ)+ρδ2(wdl+rdk)
(1−δ2(1−ρ))(1−δ) ≥ wdl1−δ . Simplification yields the following:
ρ ≥ (1− δ)(βk
1−βlβ + cp)
δ(1− β)k1−βlβ (2.19)
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The elite would play θ = 0 when reaching democracy is sufficiently unlikely that they
do not protect their profit in the case of autocracy: V Ae (0) ≥ V Ae (1)⇐⇒
rdk−δce
1−δ2(1−ρ) ≥ rsk(1−δ)−δce(1−δ)+δ
2ρ(1−τp)rsk
(1−δ2(1−ρ))(1−δ) . Simplification leads to the following inequality
condition:
δ <
(k + a)β − kβ
(k + a)β − kβτp (2.20)
The elite must not be willing to provide transfers to deter revolution. When θii ≤
θ¯, the elite must prefer revolutionary autocracy to stable autocracy with the threat of
redistribution, V Ae (0, 0) ≥ V Ae (0, θii):
ρ ≤
(1− δ)
[
(1− β)lβk1−β(k + aθ)β − ceδ(k + aθ)β − (1− β)lβk(1 + δ)
]
(1− β)lβkδ2 (2.21)
If this constraint holds than the constraint that prevents the elite from providing transfers,
τ ∗e , θ
i, likewise holds, as those transfers are larger.
2.4.2.6 Revolutionary Autocracy without the Threat of Redistribution
In the revolutionary autocracy without threat of redistribution equilibrium, the elite
select τe = 0, θ = 1 and ignore in autocracy. The poor choose to mobilize for rev-
olution in autocracy. In democracy, the poor select τp = τ¯p and the elite stay. rev-
olutionary autocracy without threat of redistribution results when: δ ≥ (k+a)β−kβ
(k+a)β−kβτp ,
(1−δ)[cp(k+a)β+βlβ(k+a)]
δ(1−β)lβk(1−τp) ≤ ρ ≤
k(1−β)lβ [τp(1+δ)−1]−ce(k+a)β
k(1−β)lβτpδ , and
ρ ≥ (1−δ)[(1−β)lβk(k+aθ)β−ceδ(k+a)β(k+aθ)β−(1−τe)(1−β)lβk(k+a)β(1+δ)]
δ2(1−β)lβk[(1−τe)(k+a)β−(1−τp)(k+aθ)β ] .
Proof. In democracy, the poor would select τp = τ¯p, as θ = 1, and the elite would stay,
as τp = τ¯p.
In autocracy, ignoring mobilization must be incentive compatible for the elite: V Ae (ignore) ≥
V Ae (democratize)⇐⇒ rsk(1−δ)−δce(1−δ)+δ
2ρ(1−τp)rsk
(1−δ2(1−ρ))(1−δ) ≥ rsk+ δ(1−τp)rsk1−δ . Simplification yields:
ρ ≤ k(1− β)l
β [τp(1 + δ)− 1]− ce(k + a)β
k(1− β)lβτpδ (2.22)
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The poor must be willing to mobilize: V Ap (mobilize) ≥ V Ap (concede)⇐⇒
wsl(1−δ)−cpδ(1−δ)+δ2ρ[(1−τp)rsk+wsl]
(1−δ)(1−δ2(1−ρ)) ≥ wsl1−δ . Simplification reveals:
ρ ≥
(1− δ)
[
cp(k + a)
β + βlβ(k + a)
]
δ(1− β)lβk(1− τp) (2.23)
θ = 1 must be incentive compatible for the elite: V Ae (1) ≥ V Ae (0)⇐⇒
rsk(1−δ)−δce(1−δ)+δ2ρ(1−τp)rsk
(1−δ2(1−ρ))(1−δ) ≥ rdk−δce1−δ2(1−ρ) . Plugging in values and simplifying leads to the
following inequality condition:
δ ≥ (k + a)
β − kβ
(k + a)β − kβτp (2.24)
We also need to verify that the elite would not be willing to purchase the poor’s
support using transfers. We do not need to check for the deviation to stable autocracy
with the threat of redistribution. If stable autocracy with the threat of redistribution
were possible, θ = 1 would be more than enough to prevent revolution. The revolutionary
autocracy without threat of redistribution equilibrium assumes that θ = 1 is insufficient
to prevent mobilization: θii > θ¯, so I need only check deviations to the θi equilibrium.
The elite must be unwilling to prevent revolution using transfers in stable autocracy
without the threat of redistribution: V Ae (0, 1) ≥ V Ae (τ ∗e , θi). Simplification reveals:
ρ ≥
(1− δ)
[
(1− β)lβk(k + aθ)β − ceδ(k + a)β(k + aθ)β − (1− τe)(1− β)lβk(k + a)β(1 + δ)
]
δ2(1− β)lβk
[
(1− τe)(k + a)β − (1− τp)(k + aθ)β
]
(2.25)
2.4.2.7 Stable Autocracy without Transfers
In the stable autocracy without transfers equilibrium, the elite select τe, θ = 0 and
ignore in autocracy. The poor concede. In democracy, which is never reached, the
poor select τp = 1 and the elite flee. Stable autocracy without transfers results when
ρ ≤ (1−β)lβk1−βδ−ce
(1−β)lβk1−βδ and ρ ≤ (1−δ)[cp+βl
βk1−β ]
δ(1−β)lβk1−β .
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Proof. In democracy, the elite flee, because τp = 1, which is greater than τ¯p. The poor
select τp = 1, because θ = 0, which is less than θ¯.
In autocracy, the elite ignore as long as V Ae (ignore) ≥ V Ae (democratize). Then, the
following inequality must hold:
ρ ≤ (1− β)l
βk1−βδ − ce
(1− β)lβk1−βδ (2.26)
The poor must be unwilling to mobilize: V Ap (concede) ≥ V Ap (mobilize). Simplification
reveals:
ρ ≤ (1− δ)[cp + βl
βk1−β]
δ(1− β)lβk1−β (2.27)
The elite would not provide any transfers as long as the poor do not mobilize for
revolution: τe, θ = 0.
2.4.3 Countries Included in the Empirical Analysis
OECD countries are excluded from the sample in the year they become OECD and
for all subsequent years in the model estimating the impact of market openness on in-
equality. The following 101 countries were included: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo
Brazzaville, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast,
Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedo-
nia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sin-
gapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela,
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Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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CHAPTER III
Economic Sanctions
3.1 Introduction
On March 18th, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed the Crimean Penin-
sula from Ukraine. The United States and European Union immediately condemned the
annexation arguing that Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. They then in-
stituted sanctions against Russia, and more particularly against Russians who are part
of Putin’s “inner circle.” According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (March 20,
2014), “Yuri Kovalchuk [one of the sanction targets] is the largest single shareholder of
Bank Rossiya and is also the personal banker for senior officials of the Russian Federa-
tion including Putin.”’ The sanctions targeted at Kovalchuk prevent Visa and Mastercard
from processing payments to Rossiya Bank, Russia’s 15th largest bank, which controls
an estimated $12 billion dollars in assets. In response to the sanctions, Putin announced
that Russia will develop its own credit card system and cut foreign competitors out of
the market (Anishchuk March 27, 2014).
Putin’s decision to respond to the sanctions by building up domestic substitutes for
international services points to an often overlooked consequence of international eco-
nomic sanctions. Because economic sanctions restrict access to foreign products in the
sanctioned country, sanctions increase domestic demand for domestic products. In lim-
iting foreign access to the market and thereby removing foreign competition, sanctions
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encourage the domestic provision of goods and services in which the sanctioned country
lacks comparative advantage. In fact, domestic industrial products emerged to replace
imports, and industrial production actually increased under sanctions in countries as di-
verse as South Africa, Iraq and Yugoslavia (Selden 1999). The intuition behind the effect
of sanctions is similar to the logic often applied to tariffs: They raise domestic prices
and protect domestic producers who would otherwise be unable to compete with foreign
producers.
This article integrates research on economic sanctions and trade policy to assess the
impact of sanctions on tariff rates. By fostering domestic production of comparatively
disadvantaged goods, sanctions create and empower a group of producers who seek mar-
ket protection through tariffs. It is only through protection that uncompetitive firms
maintain their market share. Furthermore, because sanctions often target politically im-
portant actors, sanction targets have the disproportionate ability to influence political
leaders and obtain that protection. The Russian example provides a timely illustration.
If Putin and his financiers plan to create a domestic credit card system, will it be com-
petitive with global providers? The long record of import substitution industrialization
demonstrates that industries created under stringent market protection are seldom com-
petitive (e.g., Panagariya 2004). If they are uncompetitive, what will happen to the
operators of the Russian credit card system once the sanctions are lifted? Will they lose
market share or stop providing credit card services when they are forced to compete with
foreign providers? Their loss of market share is unlikely. It is more likely that they will
successfully pressure the Russian government for privileged access to the Russian market.
After all, the U.S. and E.U. targeted them precisely because of their political importance
to the Russian regime.
I argue that sanctions directly impact markets in the short-term and thereby influence
economic policies long after the sanctions are lifted. Sanctions immediately limit trade
flows into and out of the target country. This cessation of trade is thought to be extremely
costly in its own right, enabling the government to crack down on the political opposi-
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tion; undermining economic stability, particularly for women and children; and harming
the environment (Lopez and Cortright 1995, Weiss et al. 1997, Allen 2008, Peksen and
Drury 2010, Drury and Peksen 2012). While the immediate impact of sanctions is clearly
important, existing literature neglects the long-term economic effects of sanctions. When
trade flows are restricted by sanctions, exporters in the sanctioned country are no longer
able to reach foreign markets, and import-competing firms no longer compete with for-
eign firms. Sanctions have effects analogous to domestic trade barriers in the sanctioned
country: They benefit import-competing firms at the expense of export firms and con-
sumers. Consequently, sanctions redirect production away from the global market and
toward meeting the demands of the domestic market. These changes increase production
in comparatively disadvantaged sectors.
This distortion of production towards internationally uncompetitive industries enables
producers to charge more for their products, creating rents for certain producers, who are
protected from foreign competition. Protected producers may then use their rents to pres-
sure the government to implement market restrictions, thereby protecting and perhaps
even furthering their market rents in the future. In particular, import-competing firms
and the owners of scarce factors seek to substitute the protection afforded by sanctions
with protective policies. Furthermore, these firms demonstrate their importance during
the sanction period; they provide employment and growth during a time when many
export firms are floundering. Thus, while the removal of sanctions directly facilitates
cross-border trade, sanctions also have an indirect effect that may undermine these flows.
Sanctions create a powerful domestic interest group in the target country who benefits
from market protection and has the economic resources and political clout to secure that
protection.
The paper first develops a theory of how sanctions impact market restrictions. A de-
cision theoretic model shows how sanctions lead to market distortions that increase the
production of import-competing goods and decrease the production of export goods. A
game theoretic model then illustrates how import-competing firms pressure the govern-
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ment for market protection. The theory is evaluated using an autoregressive distributed
lag model. The model provides estimates of the short- and long-term effects of sanctions,
which is particularly important here because it is unclear precisely when the market pro-
tection will be implemented. The empirical section provides evidence consistent with
the protection-inducing power of sanctions in a time-series, cross-sectional sample. The
results are robust to the use of a weighted, time-series model. The paper concludes with
implications for future research.
3.2 Economic Sanctions and Trade Protection
Economic sanctions are threats that entail economic costs, often by limiting trade or
financial flows, if the sanctioned country does not concede to some demand by the sanc-
tioning country. Based on standard economic theories, countries should export goods
that they produce more efficiently than other countries and import goods that are more
efficiently produced elsewhere. In other words, countries export comparative advantaged
goods. Accordingly, sanctions, which restrict the flow of goods and services across bor-
ders, reduce the production of comparative advantaged products and increase the pro-
duction of comparative disadvantaged products in the sanctioned country. Restrictions,
therefore, prevent countries from reaping the benefits of specialization. More specifi-
cally then, trade sanctions reduce competition for import-competing producers. Import-
competing producers often lack comparative advantage in production, either because
they lack technology or the production of their products intensively uses scarce factors of
production,1 and they have higher production costs than foreign producers. Sanctions,
particularly those that provide protection from imports, benefit those producers who lack
comparative advantage. Economic sanctions have an effect similar to the effect of tariffs:
they reduce competition and increase prices.
In addition, economic sanctions limit the external market for export-oriented produc-
1These interpretations of comparative advantage are attributed to Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Ohlin
respectively.
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ers. Export-oriented producers often have a comparative advantage in their production,
and they are able to compete with foreign producers. They are often large firms that
sell their products to domestic and foreign markets (Melitz 2003). Trade sanctions re-
strict exports from the sanctioned country. When the sanctions are effective in limiting
trade flows, export-oriented producers lose access to foreign markets. They may go out
of business or substitute their normally competitive production for the production of a
high-priced, protected good in which the country lacks comparative advantage. In sum,
producers who compete with imports will benefit, as sanctions increase domestic prices
and their profits, while exporters and consumers will be harmed, as sanctions decrease or
even eliminate access to export markets and increase prices. Thus, the market distortions
produced by sanctions are remarkably similar to distortions produced by tariffs (Selden
1999, Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999). The following decision-theoretic model illustrates
the impact of sanctions on export and import-competing sectors.
3.2.1 Market Distortions
In the model, there is one domestic producer of two goods. The goods are either
import-competing or export goods.2 For simplicity, the two goods and their production
processes are unrelated. The firm’s profits are determined by quantity competition.3 The
firm determines the optimal quantity of each good to maximize its profit. The firm is a
price-taker, and sanctions affect the quantities produced in the model. The firm’s profit
function is: Π = qi(pi + s − ciqi) + qe(pe − s − ceqe), where subscripts, e and i, denote
whether the good is an export good or an import-competing good. q is the quantity of
the good produced, p is the price of the good, s is the amount of sanctions in place, and
c is the cost of production. Note that sanctions increase the return to import-competing
2The logic is similar to Ricardo’s well-known example of cloth and wine production in England and
Portugal. Both countries may produce both goods, but the relative cost of cloth production is lower
in England and the relative cost of wine production is lower in Portugal. At the time, England had
a comparative advantage in cloth production, and cloth was an export product. England could not
efficiently produce wine, so wine was an import-competing product.
3The model is similar to a Cournot model of quantity competition.
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goods, as they prevent foreign goods from entering the market in the sanctioned country.
At the same time, sanctions decrease the return to goods that were previously exported,
as sanctions often prevent the export of goods from the sanctioned country.
The firm chooses the quantities of import-competing and export goods to maximize
the profit function: maxqi,qe{qi(pi+s− ciqi) + qe(pe−s− ceqe)}. The firm’s maximization
yields the following equilibrium quantities: q∗i =
pi+s
2ci
and q∗e =
pe−s
2ce
. These quantities
define the amount of import-competing goods and export-oriented goods that yield the
largest profit for the firm. Unsurprisingly, as the price of either good increases or the
cost decreases, the production of that good increases. The effect of sanctions for quantity
produced depends on whether the good is produced for domestic or foreign sale. The
quantity of import-competing goods produced increases when sanctions are in place,
while the quantity of export goods decreases. Intuitively, the divergent effects are caused
by sanctions’ divergent impact. Sanctions increase the demand for import-competing
goods produced in the sanctioned country, as they decrease or eliminate imports that
would have helped satisfy domestic demand. Conversely, sanctions decrease the demand
for export goods produced in the sanctioned country, because many of those goods can
no longer reach consumers in other countries.
Proposition 3.1. Sanctions increase the production of import-competing goods and de-
crease the production of export goods.
Proof. The derivative of the equilibrium import-competing quantity produced with re-
spect to sanctions,
∂q∗i
∂s
= 1
2c
, is always positive. The derivative of the equilibrium export
quantity produced with respect to sanctions, ∂q
∗
e
∂s
= − 1
2c
, is always negative.
Proposition 3.1 shows how sanctions distort the market. A sanctioned country will
produce more products for consumption by the domestic market and fewer products for
consumption abroad. This often means that they will produce more goods in which the
country does not have a comparative advantage. The model provides a micro-foundation
for the work by Selden (1999), which shows that sanctions stimulate the production
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of manufactured products. Many developing countries, who are often targeted by eco-
nomic sanctions, do not have a comparative advantage in the production of manufac-
tured goods, which may rely on advanced technology and intensive capital investment.
Because the sanctions restrict the import of manufactured goods from other countries,
the sanctioned country begins to produce them, albeit in an often less-efficient way than
the foreign source. Sanctions are not the only kind of market protection that benefits
import-competing producers. Tariffs are also an important source of market protection.
The next section turns to the interaction between producers and policymakers under
sanctions.
3.2.2 Lobbying for Protection
A second model explores the relationship between import-competing producers and
policymakers. Import-competing producers are generally assumed to pressure the govern-
ment for market protection, as they are less efficient than foreign producers. Sanctions
increase the profits of import-competing producers, who may then use their profits to
lobby for market protection. Producers in uncompetitive industries seek to replace the
market protection afforded by sanctions with market protection provided by their own
government. The game has two actors, the government and an import-competing firm.
The market determines the amount of resources firms have for consumption, as well as
for lobbying the government. The firm selects political donations, and the government
selects protectionist policies. The sequence of play is as follows:
Period I
1. Nature determines the level of sanctions: s ∈ R+
2. Firm maximizes its first period profit by selecting quantity: maxq{Πs = q(p +
s− cq)}
3. Firm selects political donations, d ∈ R+, to maximize both period profits
4. Firm consumes all profit that was earned in Period I less political donations
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Period II
1. Sanctions are no longer in place in the second period, s = 0
2. Government determines tariff level, t ∈ R+, which depends on Period I donations
3. Firm maximizes second period profit by selecting quantity: maxq{Πt = q(p +
t− cq)}
4. Firm consumes all profit that was earned in Period II
Note that the structure of the game enables firms to substitute tariffs for sanctions. In the
first period, the firm benefits from the imposition of sanctions and can use its increased
profit to lobby the government for tariffs. In the second period, the sanctions are lifted
and the firm’s profits are increased by the tariffs it purchased in the first period. Although
the sequencing of the model provides theoretical clarity, in reality firms may be uncertain
about when sanctions will be lifted. Therefore, they are likely to lobby for protection
while sanctions are in place and after they are lifted. Because the sanctions have an effect
over time, the empirical specifications will make few assumptions about timing and will
instead isolate short-term, long-term and cumulative effects of sanctions.
In the first model only sanctions increased profits; in the second model profits are
increased by both sanctions and tariffs, as we focus exclusively on an import-competing
firm. The profit of the firm in both periods is denoted: Πx = q(p + x − cq), where q
is the quantity produced by the firm, c is the cost of production, and p is the baseline
price of the good produced. In the above equation, x denotes the amount of sanctions
or tariffs in place in a given period: x ∈ {s, t}. When sanctions are in place, x = s;
when tariffs are in place, x = t. The subscripts on the profit function, Πs or Πt, are
used to denote whether sanctions or tariffs are implemented in the period when profits
are realized (first or second periods respectively). The firm’s profit is increasing in both
sanctions and tariffs. In the first period, only sanctions may be in place; in the second
period, the size of the tariffs depends on the political contributions from the first period.
The profit function is positive at low values of q, but as q becomes very large, production
becomes increasingly expensive, and eventually profits become negative. This method
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for modeling production costs is similar to more general convex cost functions, and it
ensures an explicit solution to the firm’s profit maximization.
The firm maximizes the profit function with respect to quantity: maxq{Πx = q(p +
x− cq)}. The equilibrium quantity produced by the firm is: q∗ = p+x
2c
and its equilibrium
profit is: Πx =
(p+x)2
4c
. The subscript x denotes that this is a general solution, and we
need only plug s or t in for x to obtain the equilibrium profit of the firm when sanctions
or tariffs are in place. The firm-owners derive utility from consumption in the first and
second period: Uf = lnc1 +δlnc2, where c1 is first period consumption, c2 is second period
consumption, and δ is the firm’s discount rate. The firm-owners cannot consume more
than they produce however, so: c1 ≤ Πs−d, where d is the amount of campaign donations
they provide to the government, and c2 ≤ Πt.4 The firm-owner’s utility function is concave
- increasing at a decreasing rate - in each period; this functional form is selected for ease
of derivation, but many utility functions are assumed to be concave.5
The government derives utility from political donations, d, which it receives in ex-
change for implementing tariffs, t. One need not think that d always takes the form of
money. d may also represent political support, in which case, the cost should be thought
of in terms of effort and the expenses associated with effort, including opportunity cost or
even functional costs like transportation and materials. Tariffs are also costly for the do-
mestic population, as they raise prices for consumers. The government’s utility function
takes the following form: Ug = ln(αdt − t2), where α is the weight that the government
places on political donations, d are political donations, and t is the tariff rate selected
by the government. The government derives positive utility from small amounts of tar-
iffs (due to their association with donations), but at some point, the negative effects of
tariffs for the overall population and economy as a whole overwhelm the benefits. These
4There is no reason to give donations in the second period, as this is just a two-period model, and
the donations would not yield greater protection until the subsequent period, which does not exist here.
5When a linear utility function is used, a corner solution results. The firm either expends all his
income on donations or expends none (depending on whether consumption is larger in the future when
tariffs may be implemented or consumption is larger in the present, because the cost of waiting or the
price of tariffs is prohibitively high). The natural log ensures an interior solution, and it is analytically
attractive here, because the solution is again explicit.
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negative effects are captured by the −t2 in the government’s utility function.
3.2.2.1 Model Solution
The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is appropriate when
the game is sequential, as it ensures that individually rational strategies are played at
every node. To solve the game, I proceed by backward induction. In the second period,
the firm selects q to maximize profits: q∗ = p+t
∗
2c
and consumes everything: c2 = Πt∗ =
(p+t∗)2
4c
.
The government selects the tariff rate to maximize his utility function: maxt{Ug =
ln(αdt−t2)}.6 The equilibrium tariff rate is: t∗ = αd
2
. The results of this simple derivation
are consistent with much of the trade literature. Tariffs are increasing in the weight that
the government places on donations, α, and in donations themselves, d. The intuition
for the result is a little different than the standard Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001)
model, where the government pursues protection, as it values the firm’s utility. Here,
the government pursues protection, because it receives political support in exchange for
protection.7
There is no commitment problem in the model. I assume that the firm takes the
government price for tariffs (in terms of campaign donations) and maximizes its utility.
The firm maximizes: maxd{Uf = lnc1+δlnc2}, subject to the following conditions: t = αd2 ,
c1 ≤ Πx − d and c2 ≤ Πt. The first condition comes from the price that the government
charges for the tariffs. The second and third conditions are similar to budget constraints:
The firm-owners may not consume more than the firm earns. Both the inequalities are
met with equality because firm utility is increasing in consumption, so it would not discard
any profit. Because they are met with equality, the conditions may be substituted into
6The natural log in the utility function is unimportant here. It is included for consistency with the
firm’s utility function.
7In addition, the standard model focuses on protection in democracies. Many of the countries targeted
by sanctions are weak democracies or autocracies. Policymakers in undemocratic institutional settings
should be more susceptible to particularist protectionist pressure than their counterparts in democracies
(e.g., Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2000, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Milner and Kubota 2005).
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the maximization problem: maxd{Uf = ln[ (p+s)24c − d] + δln[ (2p+αd)
2
16c
]}. The equilibrium
amount of campaign donations is: d∗ = δα(p+s)
2−8cp
4αc(1+2δ)
. The main proposition follows.
Proposition 3.2. Market protection is increasing in economic sanctions.
Proof. Recall that t∗ = αd
∗
2
and d∗ = δα(p+s)
2−8cp
4αc(1+2δ)
. By substitution, we know: t∗ =
δα(p+s)2−8cp
8c(1+2δ)
Tariffs are increasing in sanctions: ∂t
∗
∂s
= δα(p+s)
4c(1+2δ)
.
Proposition 3.2 provides a ceteris paribus result: Given an existing balance of bargain-
ing power between the import-competing firms, who prefer increased protection, and the
country’s citizens, who prefer less protection, sanctions increase the bargaining power of
the import competing-firms through their impact on profits. Import-competing firms in-
crease their profits under sanctions, because they no longer have to compete with foreign
producers, and they use these excess profits to lobby the government for more protection.
The model provides an estimate of baseline protection without sanctions, t∗ = δαp
2−8cp
8c(1+2δ)
,
which loosely represents the government’s balancing act between the benefits of higher
prices for import competing producers and the cost of higher prices for consumers. Sanc-
tions, then, increase this baseline by the following rate: ∂t
∗
∂s
= δα(p+s)
4c(1+2δ)
.
Like most trade policy research, the model presented here focuses on the unilateral
selection of trade policy, where governments set trade policy in response to pressure from
import-competing, domestic interest groups and consumers. Researchers have begun to
evaluate the impact of multilateral institutions, which make exporters relevant to trade
policy (Betz 2014, Gilligan 1997). If trade policy is set through reciprocity in multilateral
negotiations, then exporters may pressure the government to concede to foreign demands
for market liberalization in exchange for reciprocal liberalization elsewhere that enables
the exporters to more easily serve the foreign market. Proposition 3.1 shows that sanc-
tions increase the returns to production for the domestic market and decrease returns to
production for foreign markets. This means that import-competing firms gain resources,
while exporters lose resources under sanctions. If exporters are integral to trade liberaliza-
tion as Betz (2014) and Gilligan (1997) argue, then sanctions produce market protection
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through yet another channel: Exporters, who are relatively less powerful than before the
sanctions were implemented, will have less influence to counter the protectionist pressure
from the import competing firms.
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the protection-producing effect of sanctions
comes from the Corn Laws in the United Kingdom. Although most seminal work (e.g.,
Schonhardt-Bailey 2006) addresses the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, an equally im-
portant question is how the Corn Laws became so severe in the first place. The intensi-
fication of agricultural protection in the U.K. was at least partially driven by American
trade sanctions. The United States attempted to remain neutral during the Napoleonic
Wars, reaping the gains from trade with both the U.K. and France. However, British
forces seized American merchant ships and forced the seamen into the armed services.
The violations of neutrality led to the implementation of the U.S. Embargo Act of 1807.
The embargo is an example of a sanction that forbade trade between the U.S. and U.K.
It therefore provided protection for Britain’s landed elite, who could not compete with
American wheat (which is called “corn” in the U.K.). Because of the protection “fur-
nished by war”, and particularly by the American embargo, corn prices in the U.K.
mounted: from an average of 83 shillings from 1794-1813 to 92 shillings from 1804-1813
and finally to 108 shillings from 1809-1813 (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997, p. 69). The price
jump was largely due to the break in trade between the U.S. and U.K.
When the boycott was lifted in 1809 and the war over in 1815, the British agricul-
turalists sought trade protection. The Corn Law of 1815 significantly deepened agricul-
tural protection. The law prevented trade whenever the price of corn dropped below
80 shillings. The initial law solely prevented trade, it did not garner any government
revenue. In 1828, the Corn Laws were amended again, providing for tariffs on imports,
which produced both protection and revenue (Schonhardt-Bailey 1997, p. 5-6). In short,
the American boycott protected British agricultural producers, driving up the cost of
wheat in the U.K. Once the boycott was lifted, the producers sought trade restrictions
to protect their market position. The boycott strengthened the landed elite in Britain,
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particularly relative to the industrialists who suffered from their inability to reach the
American market. The enhanced power of the landed elite helped them obtain more
stringent protection in 1815.
Many scholars have identified a selection problem inherent in the implementation
of sanctions: when sanctions are effective, the target country backs down before the
sanctions are put in place and the sanctions are not actually observed (e.g., Smith 1996,
Nooruddin 2002, Lacy and Niou 2004, Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). When sanctions
are actually implemented, we know that the threatened sanctions were not costly enough,
or the interest groups that are negatively effected by the sanctions were not important
enough, to force the target to back down.8
The fact that observed sanctions have already failed to elicit concessions likely strength-
ens the impact of sanctions on market protection. There are two possibilities: the sanction
may target (1) politically important actors or (2) politically unimportant actors. If the
sanction targets politically important actors, as most sanctioners claim they do, and the
consequences are sufficiently dire, then the sanctioned country will make the demanded
concession and the sanction will never actually be implemented. This case does not show
up in the data and has led scholars to conclude that sanctions, which are realized, are
likely to target politically unimportant actors (Becker 1995, Kaempfer and Lowenberg
2007). However, sanctions may still target politically important actors, as most sanc-
tioning countries claim, and fail to elicit concessions. If policymakers in the sanctioned
country are able to compensate the politically important actors, who bear the brunt of
the sanctions, then the sanctioned country may not concede even when their political
supporters are hurt by the sanctions. Sanctions themselves provide policymakers with a
8In assessing the effectiveness of sanctions, many scholars have used [Heckman] selection models,
because their data samples are ‘incidentally truncated’ (Greene 2008, p. 883). The samples are truncated,
because they only include implemented sanctions, which failed to garner concessions when they were
threatened. Those sanctions that were effective immediately are excluded from their samples. The
selection model is not appropriate here, because sanctioned and unsanctioned countries are included in
the sample, and I do not expect the threat of sanctions, absent their implementation, to affect market
protection. That said, the empirical results are robust to the use of a selection model (results are available
from the author).
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unique opportunity: They can compensate their supporters with preferential access to
the domestic market, and, particularly when targeted actors are politically important,
market protection is likely to endure long after the sanctions are lifted.
When the actors who bear the cost of sanctions are not politically important, policy-
makers in the target country are unlikely to concede to the demands of the sanctioning
country. Because competitive sectors are disproportionately hurt by sanctions, their lack
of political influence also means that they will not be able to obtain their preferred trade
and financial policy, which is likely more liberal than the policies preferred by their un-
competitive counterparts. In the case of the Corn Laws, the landed elite in the U.K.
were more politically powerful than the industrialists at the end of the 18th century.9 If
“protection [is] for sale” (Grossman and Helpman 1994), sanctions create a potent buyer:
Sanctions increase the profit of uncompetitive, politically important firms.
3.3 Evidence
This section provides an empirical assessment of the hypothesis that trade sanctions
are associated with higher trade protection. Trade sanction is the independent variable of
interest. The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) database details every sanction
implemented between 1945 and 2010 (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2013).10 TIES
extends the prominent study conducted by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (2007) and
provides extensive information on the sanction type. I code new trade sanction variables
for those sanctions that include a total economic embargo, a partial economic embargo,
an import restriction, an export restriction, or a blockade. The variables identify those
9In fact, the transition of greater political and economic power to industrialists and workers with the
1832 Reform Act was one of the major causes of the eventual dismantling of the Corn Laws (Schonhardt-
Bailey 2006).
10The TIES database covers sanctions initiated between 1945 and 2005, but many sanctions in the
database remain in place much longer. In prior communication, T. Clifton Morgan, the lead scholar
on the data collection project, indicated that the summaries for the more recent sanctions were written
later and that the sanctions data is updated until about 2010. The results are similar using a restricted
sample, which ends in 2005, with the exception of the effect of trade sanctions. The weakness of the
tariff results is unsurprising given that the tariff data are plagued by missing observations, particularly
earlier in the sample.
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sanctions that restrict the flow of goods between countries. I code two sanctions variables:
Trade Sanction Count sums up the number of trade sanctions in place in a given target-
country year, while Trade Sanction Binary is zero in country years without sanctions and
one in country years with sanctions. The tariff rate is the dependent variable. Tariff data
come from the World Bank World Development Indicators and include data from 1988
to 2012 (World Bank 2013). They are the average mean tariffs weighted by the product
import shares. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the data.11
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year 1989.9 12.31 1966 2010 6338
Trade Sanction Count 0.26 0.67 0 11 6338
Trade Sanction Binary 0.13 0.34 0 1 6338
Sum Trade Sanction 0.70 2.52 0 30 6338
Financial Sanction Count 0.16 0.46 0 3 6338
Financial Sanction Binary 0.12 0.33 0 1 6338
Sum Financial Sanction 0.59 2.24 0 30 6338
Tariff 7.64 8.95 0 254.58 1965
Openness -0.03 1.51 -1.76 2.53 5529
Reform 10.34 6.35 0 21 2477
MID 0.26 0.44 0 1 6338
Polity 1.04 7.46 -10 10 5601
Checks 2.58 1.7 1 18 4937
Political Turnover 0.16 0.37 0 1 5102
GDP per capita 8934.85 11330.71 160.8 118835.48 6082
IMF Program 0.28 0.56 0 4 6338
WTO 0.32 0.47 0 1 6338
Total Trade 51780.61 184913.06 -18 3466210 6122
3.3.1 Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model
The model and preceding discussion raise important questions regarding the impact of
sanctions: when are the effects of sanctions realized and how long do the effects endure?
Recall that the U.S. embargo of the U.K. did not immediately increase protection, but it
eventually lead to an intensification of the Corn Laws, increasing the equilibrium amount
11The controls, derivation of the summed sanction variables, and the financial sanctions variables are
described in the corresponding empirical sections.
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of agricultural protection. The autoregressive distributed lag model (ADL) is particularly
attractive for answering duration questions. The ADL provides an estimate of the impact
of sanctions in both the short-term and the long-term. The ADL is a general version of
a static model: By including a lag structure for both the independent and dependent
variables, it imposes fewer restrictions on the relationship between them (Beck and Katz
2011, p. 346). I estimate the model:
Protectionit = α0 + α1Protectioni,t−1 + β0Sanctionit + β1Sanctioni,t−1 + i,t (3.1)
where Protectionit is the tariff rate and Sanctionit is the number of sanctions in place in
country i at time t. Equation 3.1 allows us to estimate the correlation between sanctions
in the current period and protection, β0, as well as the correlation between sanctions from
the previous period and protection, β1, while controlling for the level of protection in the
previous period, α1. The longterm impact, or long-run multiplier (LRM), is: k1 =
β0+β1
1−α1 .
The multiplier literally divides the effect in the current and previous periods over the
per-period effect of the change in the dependent variable: “the LRM is the total effect
Xt has on Yt distributed over future time periods” (De Boef and Keele 2008, p. 191).
12
I control for the regime type of the country from the Polity index (Marshall, Jaggers
and Gurr 2013),13 because sanctions and tariffs could be associated with regime type.14
I also control for the number of checks [and balances] in the political system and for
government turnover (Beck et al. 2001).15 Checks helps capture veto player arguments
about policy stasis. Turnover provides a particularly hard test for the theory, because
12The variance of k1 is computed using the delta method. The results for the variance are indistin-
guishable from using the formula in De Boef and Keele (2008). The ADL is equivalent to the error
correction model (ECM).
13I use the polity 2 measure, because it converts periods of “interruption”, including foreign occu-
pations; “interregnum” or periods of government failure; and “transition” to conventional polity scores
between -10 and 10.
14Sanctions could be more effective against democracies, as the political leaders are accountable to a
larger segment of the population (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Democracies may be less likely to use
military force against one another, and sanctions could substitute for military conflict. Democracies are
also likely to have lower tariff rates and to trade with one another.
15Government turnover is coded using the years in office variable from Beck et al. (2001). Turnover
takes on a value of one during a government’s first year in office.
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sanctions could affect economic policy by undermining political support for economically
liberal leaders. I control for GDP per capita (purchasing power parity converted to GDP
per capita in thousands of dollars, derived from growth rates, at 2005 constant prices)
from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012), as wealthy countries
might be particularly costly sanction targets. I also control for membership in the World
Trade Organization (WTO website).
Table 3.2 reports the results from numerous specifications. Column 1 reports the
results from a static model, which includes the lagged dependent variable, but only in-
cludes the sanctions variable from the present period, and, thus, does not measure the
accumulation of the effects of sanctions over time. Column 2 reports the static model
with a number of controls. Columns 3 and 4 report the results from feasible generalized
least squares models, which account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Columns
5 and 6 report the results of the ADL model (minimalist and with controls respectively),
and the LRM is included at the bottom of the table. In all models, trade sanctions are
positively correlated with tariff rates, and the correlation holds in the ADL models both
in the short- and long-run. The long-run multiplier of trade sanctions is significant at the
five percent level in the model with controls. We can think of the LRM as the total effect
that sanctions have on tariff rates. Here the total effect is significant and not insubstan-
tial. An increase of one trade sanction is correlated with an increase in the tariff level
by over 0.5 percentage points in the model with controls. The average tariff level in the
sample is 7.6 percent. Thus, a one-unit increase in trade sanctions increases average tariff
rates by almost 7 percent. The within country standard deviation in the tariff rate is
7.14 percent. One sanction is correlated with an increase in the tariff rate in the long-run
by one-fourteenth of a standard deviation. Figure 3.1 provides a graphic representation
of the effects of sanctions over time. The graph shows that the estimated effect of trade
sanctions is quite rapid: most of the increase in tariffs associated with trade sanctions is
felt in the first period. The consequences of trade sanctions may be particularly prompt,
because governments can quickly manipulate tariff rates.
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Table 3.2: Trade Sanctions and Tariff Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FGLS FGLS ADL ADL
lag Tariff 0.0532 0.0319 0.286∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.0532 0.0309
(0.68) (0.54) (23.36) (21.46) (0.68) (0.54)
Trade Sanctions Count 0.386∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.0250 0.144∗∗ 0.378∗ 0.257
(1.67) (2.03) (0.39) (2.15) (1.95) (1.45)
lag Trade Sanctions Count 0.0141 0.232∗∗
(0.12) (2.07)
Polity -0.239∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.0746
(-1.81) (-20.10) (-1.03)
lag Polity -0.223∗∗
(-2.08)
GDP per capita -0.209∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0642
(-2.50) (-31.24) (-0.89)
lag GDP per capita -0.121
(-0.99)
WTO Member -1.135 -0.332∗∗∗ 0.316
(-1.01) (-3.19) (0.61)
lag WTO Member -1.714∗
(-1.66)
Checks 0.440 0.232∗∗∗ 0.416
(1.21) (15.24) (1.57)
lag Checks 0.0973
(0.41)
Political Turnover 0.700 0.447∗∗∗ 0.599
(0.90) (8.13) (0.83)
lag Political Turnover -0.655
(-1.18)
Constant 5.768∗∗∗ 9.795∗∗∗ 4.577∗∗∗ 8.001∗∗∗ 5.765∗∗∗ 9.776∗∗∗
(11.95) (10.62) (32.89) (78.15) (12.04) (10.48)
LRM 0.414 0.505∗∗
(1.54) (2.30)
N 1453 1223 1440 1213 1453 1209
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; two-tailed test;
OLS and ADL analyses include robust standard errors, clustered by country, and country fixed effects.
FGLS specifies a heteroskedastic error structure and panel specific AR(1) autocorrelation.
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Figure 3.1: Effect of Trade Sanctions Over Time
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3.3.2 Weighted, Time-Series Model
This section assesses the robustness of the ADL results using an alternative specifica-
tion suggested by Blackwell and Glynn (2013) and Robins, Herna´n and Brumback (2000).
The discussion of the method will adhere to the experimental terminology used by the
authors, where treatment is the presence of a trade sanction and control is the absence of
a sanction. First, the authors recommend weighing the treatment variable by the inverse
probability of treatment, which transforms the sample population to replicate the actual
population and helps account for confounding variables. Second, they recommend calcu-
lating two treatment variables: a ‘blip’ variable that captures the effect of one treatment
period and a ‘cumulative’ variable that captures the effect of a treatment that is in place
for an extended period. The coefficient on the cumulative variable captures the effect of
one more year of sanctions given that sanctions have already been in place for a number
of years. The estimates of the blip and cumulative effects are particularly useful, because
they have similar substantive interpretations to the short- and long-run effects from the
ADL but are computed differently.
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The inverse probability of treatment is used to weigh the treatment in the estimate
of the treatment’s impact on the dependent variable. In the analysis here, the dependent
variable is the tariff rate in the sanctioned country. ŜW i is the inverse probability of
treatment:
ŜW i =
T∏
t=1
P̂ r[Sanctionit|Sanctioni,t−1; γˆ]
P̂ r[Sanctionit|Sanctioni,t−1, Controlsit; αˆ]
(3.2)
The numerator in Equation 3.2 gives the probability of treatment, sanctions here, condi-
tional on a treatment history for the estimator (γˆ) in a specific period. The denominator
is similar, except it also conditions the probability of treatment on a set of covariates for
the estimator (αˆ). The product of the ratios over a country’s history up to the current
time period captures the probability of treatment for that history.16
I use a logistic regression model to estimate the binary probability of treatment:
Sanctionit = f(Sanctioni,t−1, Sanctioni,t−2,Controls it) (3.3)
I include the following controls, Controls it, when estimating the denominator of ŜW i, and
exclude them when estimating the numerator. Economic controls include GDP per capita
and total trade (from Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009, Barbieri and Keshk 2012).17 Po-
litical controls again include polity, checks [and balances] and turnover. International
controls include membership in the WTO, as well as the presence of a Militarized Inter-
national Dispute (from Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004, Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996).
MID provides a useful predictor of sanctions, because sanctions are aimed at changing
the sanctioned country’s policy and often result from a dispute.
I then use the weighted regression to estimate the impact of sanctions on market
16Missing treatment probabilities take the probability of treatment from the previous year. This as-
sumption reduces the problem of missing data and is unlikely to bias results, as the treatment probabilities
are unlikely to change substantially from year to year, given the relative stability of the predictors.
17Total trade is the sum of all imports and exports in thousands of dollars. Total trade is not included
in the previous models, because the impact of sanctions on tariff rates is expected to accrue through
sanctions’ impact on trade. Total trade is included in the weight calculation, because trade could effect
the attractiveness of a specific sanction target.
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protection:
Protection i,t = β0 + β1Sanction i,t + β2Sum Sanction i,t−1 +  (3.4)
Like Blackwell and Glynn (2013), I am interested in both the immediate and cumulative
effects of sanctions, and I retain the individual sanctions variable, Sanctioni,t, in the
regression, as well as a cumulative variable, Sum Sanctioni,t =
∑t
k=1 Sanctioni,k, where
Sanctioni,k=1 when one or more sanctions are in place against country i at time k and
Sanctioni,k=0 when no sanction is in place. Sum Sanctioni,t is the sum of past sanction
periods in the current sanction period. The sum starts anew when a new sanction period
begins. The variable captures the cumulative effect of past sanctions in the current
sanction period.
The results of the weighted, time-series model are displayed in Table 3.3. Column (1)
reports the findings from the logistic regression model used to compute the denominator
of the weights. Column (2) reports the weighted regression of trade sanctions on tariff
rates. The immediate or blip effect of trade sanctions on tariffs is positive, but the effect
is insignificant by conventional standards. The cumulative effect of trade sanctions is
also positive and is significant at the five percent level. In order to estimate the total
effect of sanctions, one would need to sum up the blip (2.50) and cumulative effect (0.32)
for each year sanctions are in place (on average, they are in place for 5.3 years). The
total effect of trade sanctions based on the weighted model is to increase the tariff rate
by 3.88 percent,18 which is a 50 percent increase in the average tariff rate (7.64 percent
is the average tariff in the sample). Thus, using two distinct empirical specifications,
sanctions are correlated with higher tariff rates. Although the estimated impact of trade
sanctions is about seven times larger in the weighted model than the LRM in the ECM,
both findings are consistent with the hypothesis that trade sanctions produce greater
market protection.
18The calculation is: 2.5+0.32*4.3 = 3.88.
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Table 3.3: Weighted, Time-Series Model
(1) (2)
Logistic Weighted OLS
Trade Sanction Binary 2.496
(1.37)
lag Sum Trade Sanction Binary 0.318∗∗
(2.22)
lag Trade Sanction Binary 4.200∗∗∗
(20.14)
2-yr lag Sum Trade Sanction Binary 0.0728∗∗∗
(2.78)
MID 0.707∗∗∗
(4.89)
Polity 0.0271∗
(1.78)
GDP per capita -0.0245
(-0.00)
WTO Member -0.434∗∗∗
(-2.79)
Checks 0.0570
(0.94)
Political Turnover 0.509∗∗
(2.39)
Total Trade 0.728∗∗
(2.31)
Constant -3.764∗∗∗ -93982.4
(-17.84) (-1.56)
N 4125 1316
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; models include linear
and quadratic time trends and use robust standard errors, clustered by country.
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3.4 Economic Sanctions and Financial Protection
Thus far the theory has focused exclusively on trade sanctions, but many sanctions
restrict financial flows between countries. The logic of trade sanctions may be readily ex-
tended to financial sanctions. Financial sanctions include prohibitions on investment and
foreign aid. Closing the market to foreign capital also has distributional consequences for
firms: some firms benefit and others are harmed. Those who benefit from market closure
are often assumed to be the owners of capital in developing countries where capital is
scarce, and they are expected to prefer capital market restrictions, because restrictions
eliminate foreign competition. In addition, financial sanctions reduce capital inflows and
increase the scarcity of capital in the sanctioned country, which allows financial inter-
mediaries to charge higher interest rates and thereby increases the returns to domestic
capital owners and intermediaries.
However, the financial industry is complicated and financial firms often have compet-
ing interests: some benefit from foreign capital entry, particularly when it is channelled
through domestic banks (Pepinsky 2013), and others compete with foreign investors di-
rectly. Hence, it is important to note that specific assumptions about which financial
actors benefit are are not necessary here: The argument is that those who benefit from
sanctions will find themselves in a more attractive bargaining position when they seek
to influence economic policy, and, because they benefited from the market protection
provided by sanctions, they are likely to use their influence to secure additional market
protection. These actors gain influence and seek to replace the protection furnished by
sanctions with protectionist capital market policies. Financial sanctions produce anal-
ogous results to trade sanctions, benefiting some domestic firms and aiding them in
garnering market protection in the sanctioned country.
Consequently, some domestic capital owners and financial service providers benefit
from economic sanctions, as they are able to charge higher interest rates and service fees
when sanctions are in place. Thus, sanctions that restrict financial flows will result in
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Figure 3.2: Implications of Sanctions Against Indonesia
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increased demand for capital market restrictions in the sanctioned country.
Financial sanctions against Indonesia illustrate the logic of the theory. During the
1990’s, the European Union pursued a total economic embargo and asset freeze, while the
United States froze assets and placed import restrictions on Indonesian products. The
sanctions aimed primarily at stopping human rights abuse by President Suharto’s regime,
and they were largely unsuccessful, but they did successfully limit financial flows. Figure
3.2 displays the number of financial sanctions and the lending interest rates in Indonesia
over time,19 as well as the relationship between financial sanctions and de jure closure
of the financial market.20 Interest rates track sanctions closely. In fact, interest rates
even seem to increase in advance of sanction imposition, as many capital owners move
their assets abroad in anticipation of the sanctions. Capital account openness decreases
following the imposition of financial sanctions. The next section will evaluate whether
financial sanctions are correlated with greater financial market restrictions in a broad
sample.
19Sanctions data are from TIES database (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2013), and lending interest
rates are from the World Bank (2013).
20Openness of the capital account is measured using the Karcher and Steinberg (2013) data.
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3.5 Evidence
As before, I use the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) database, which de-
tails every sanction implemented between 1945 and 2010 (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi
2013). A sanction is coded as a financial sanction if it includes a total economic embargo,
an asset freeze, or the termination of foreign aid. Financial sanctions restrict financial
flows between countries. I code two variables: Finance Sanction Count, which sums up
the number of financial sanctions in a given target-country year, and Finance Sanction
Binary, which is zero in country years without sanctions and one in country years with
sanctions.
Recall the hypothesis that financial sanctions produce capital market restrictions.
Data on capital market liberalization are from Karcher and Steinberg (2013). Their data
are similar to the Chinn and Ito (2008) de jure measure, but they include policies from
only the relevant year, rather than a five year moving average. Their coding is particularly
useful when the object of the analysis is to isolate policy responses in a given year. Their
measure is called openness in the tables below, and it covers 182 countries from 1966 to
2010. Once merged, the data cover 179 countries.
Recent research questions the use of capital account openness to measure financial
market protection, as financial markets may be restricted in many different ways (e.g.,
Reuveny and Li 2003, Claessens and Perotti 2007, Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou
2008, Broner and Ventura 2010, Barth, Gerard Caprio and Levine 2011). Financial
sectors, particularly banks, may actually benefit from capital account liberalization in
the presence of entry restrictions on foreign banks, as foreign investors are forced to
channel their money through domestic banks (Pepinsky 2013). Entry restrictions may
even provide a substitute for the type of capital market restrictions that most political
scientists have focused on (e.g., Brooks and Kurtz 2007, Chinn and Ito 2008, Clark
et al. 2012, Freeman and Quinn 2012). I complement the openness measure with a
more comprehensive measure of financial reform from Adiad, Detragiache and Tressel
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(2008). Their Financial Reform Index is called Reform in the tables below, and it covers
91 countries from 1973 to 2005. The measure sums up the intensity of restrictions on a
number of different dimensions: credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, bank
regulation and supervision, privatization, capital account and the securities market. A
value of three on any dimension indicates the least amount of controls, while zero indicates
stringent controls. Higher numbers on the overall index indicate fewer restrictions.21
3.5.1 Empirical Results
I use the same specifications as in the proceeding analysis of trade sanctions and tariff
rates. Here I assess the effect of financial sanctions on capital account openness and
financial sanctions on reform. Table 3.4 reports results from the regressions of financial
sanctions on capital account openness, and Table 3.5 reports results from the regressions
of financial sanctions on the financial reform index. Table 3.6 reports results from the
weighted, time-series models, which again use the Blackwell and Glynn (2013) specifi-
cation. For both dependent variables, capital account openness and financial reforms,
higher values indicate more open financial markets. Thus, I expect a negative association
between financial sanctions and capital account openness, as well as financial reform.
The sign on all regression coefficients is consistent with the theory: financial sanctions
are associated with less financial openness and fewer liberalizing financial reforms. The
coefficients reach common significance levels in about half of the specifications.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 provide per period estimates: how much does a financial sanction
impact financial openness in each period? The first four columns provide OLS and FGLS
specifications, which only identify the per period effect. Columns (5) and (6) report re-
sults from the autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model, which enables the researcher
to estimate the long run multiplier or total effect of the sanctions on financial openness.
The regression results, on capital account openness, from Table 3.4 never reach signifi-
21Entry barriers and capital account restrictions are positively correlated with each other, providing
some evidence that they are complements and that the use of either index is appropriate.
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Table 3.4: Financial Sanctions and Capital Account Openness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FGLS FGLS ADL ADL
lag Openness 0.874∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗
(67.60) (74.64) (288.01) (234.65) (67.53) (70.41)
Fin. Sanctions Count -0.0300 -0.0135 -0.000376 -0.00168 -0.0159 -0.0145
(-1.30) (-0.67) (-0.19) (-0.51) (-0.69) (-0.67)
lag Fin. Sanctions Count -0.0204 0.000393
(-1.09) (0.01)
Polity 0.00735∗∗ 0.00283∗∗∗ -0.00427
(2.45) (5.65) (-0.74)
lag Polity 0.0148∗∗
(2.44)
GDP per capita 0.00649∗ 0.00224∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗
(1.96) (5.11) (2.19)
lag GDP per capita -0.0182∗
(-1.69)
IMF Program 0.0129 0.000887 0.00894
(0.81) (0.31) (0.50)
lag IMF Program 0.0190
(0.96)
Checks 0.00648 0.00107 -0.000799
(0.80) (0.64) (-0.08)
lag Checks 0.00111
(0.10)
Political Turnover -0.0205 -0.00153 -0.0130
(-0.90) (-0.63) (-0.55)
lag Political Turnover -0.0226
(-1.23)
Constant 0.0247∗∗∗ -0.0487 -0.00225 -0.0143∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0306
(6.43) (-1.44) (-0.47) (-2.48) (6.23) (-0.82)
LRM -0.288 -0.111
(-1.43) (-0.54)
N 5317 3703 5317 3703 5317 3570
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; two-tailed test;
OLS and ADL analyses include robust standard errors, clustered by country, and country fixed effects.
FGLS specifies a heteroskedastic error structure and panel specific AR(1) autocorrelation.
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Table 3.5: Financial Sanctions and Financial Market Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FGLS FGLS ADL ADL
lag Reform 0.973∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗
(203.20) (161.50) (317.52) (217.67) (199.48) (188.75)
Fin. Sanctions Count -0.242∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.0867∗ -0.132 -0.168∗∗
(-3.83) (-2.95) (-2.75) (-1.89) (-1.66) (-2.21)
lag Fin. Sanctions Count -0.165∗∗ -0.0530
(-2.00) (-0.60)
Polity 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.00672
(3.13) (2.76) (0.35)
lag Polity 0.0179
(0.83)
GDP per capita -0.00708 0.00137 0.0135
(-1.26) (0.54) (0.17)
lag GDP per capita -0.0269
(-0.32)
IMF Program 0.182∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗
(3.41) (4.30) (2.39)
lag IMF Program 0.0518
(1.09)
Checks 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗
(3.30) (2.58) (2.58)
lag Checks -0.0113
(-0.36)
Political Turnover -0.0359 0.0124 -0.0321
(-0.55) (0.27) (-0.47)
lag Political Turnover 0.00791
(0.12)
Constant 0.719∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(14.87) (8.86) (13.75) (8.35) (14.42) (8.94)
LRM -10.91∗∗∗ -5.99∗∗∗
(-3.38) (-2.71)
N 2382 2222 2382 2222 2382 2143
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; two-tailed test;
OLS and ADL analyses include robust standard errors, clustered by country, and country fixed effects.
FGLS specifies a heteroskedastic error structure and panel specific AR(1) autocorrelation.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Financial Sanctions Over Time
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cance. Alternatively, the regression results, on the financial reform variable, from Table
3.5 are significant in every specification, including the long-run multiplier, and most coef-
ficients are significant at the one percent level. Thus, financial sanctions are consistently
negatively correlated with financial openness, and the financial reform index seems to
provide a better way to capture the impact of the sanctions. The reform index provides
a more comprehensive measure of financial restrictions, including restrictions on bank
entry, credit, interest rates, bank regulation, and privatization, as well as the capital
account and the securities market.
The results of the weighted, time-series model are likewise consistent with the theory,
but the significance of the results is the reverse of the previous estimates: capital account
openness is significantly, negatively associated with financial sanctions, while financial
reform is negatively associated, and the association is insignificant. Table 3.6 reports
results from the weighted, time-series specification. This specification estimates both
a single period or “blip” effect of sanctions and a cumulative effect of sanctions from
previous periods. The differences in the significance of the results may be driven by
differences in the coding of the openness measures. The financial reform index is a more
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nuanced variable, which captures many different types of restrictions. It is likely a better
measure for per period effects, which may then be summed up to isolate the long run
effect. Alternatively, capital account openness may better capture the cumulative effect
of sanctions. Particularly, if capital account openness is more difficult to change, is less
frequently updated, or if changes are more abrupt, than it might be hard to capture
changes in capital account openness in a single year, but, over many years, it is possible
to estimate the effects. Although there are differences in the results across specifications,
financial sanctions are consistently negatively, and often significantly, associated with
financial openness and reforms.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper identifies several negative consequences of sanctions. Sanctions directly
decrease trade flows with targeted countries, which reduces competition and access to
the global market. The reduction in foreign competition in the targeted country results
in economic distortions that are similar to those induced by tariffs: Producers shift
production to comparatively disadvantaged sectors, and profits accrue to uncompetitive
producers, who are no longer forced to compete with international producers. At the
same time, the reduction in access to the global market harms exporters and consumers.
The distributional consequences of sanctions impact the relative bargaining power of
interest groups within the sanctioned country, creating new and empowering existing
special interest groups that seek market protection. Empirical models provide evidence
that is consistent with the theory. Trade sanctions are correlated with higher tariff rates,
and financial sanctions are correlated with more financial market restrictions.
The protection inducing effect of sanctions is particularly problematic in light of over-
whelming evidence that international trade provides economic benefits to countries as
a whole. The benefits of trade are now widely accepted,22 and increasing international
22Scholars have turned to assessing the causes of trade protection. For example, see Schattschneider
(1935), Rogowski (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Milner (1999), McGillivray (2004).
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Table 3.6: Weighted, Time-Series Model
(1) (2) (3)
Logistic Weighted OLS Weighted OLS
Dependent Variable Sanction Openness Reform
Financial Sanctions Binary -0.237∗∗∗ -0.492
(-2.88) (-1.54)
lag Sum Financial Sanction Binary -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0222
(-4.12) (-0.53)
lag Financial Sanctions Binary 4.991∗∗∗
(28.22)
2-yr lag Sum Financial Sanction Binary 0.0430∗
(1.70)
MID 0.256
(1.51)
Polity -0.00114
(-0.07)
GDP per capita -0.0280∗∗
(-2.50)
IMF Program -0.153
(-1.08)
Checks 0.0796
(1.38)
Political Turnover 0.181
(0.88)
Total Trade -0.173
(-0.34)
Constant -3.603∗∗∗ 8669.4∗∗∗ 27541.1∗∗∗
(-17.66) (9.63) (5.80)
N 4125 3015 1789
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; models include linear
and quadratic time trends and use robust standard errors, clustered by country.
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trade liberalization has become an important foreign policy goal in its own right. This
paper provides evidence that sanctions undermine liberalization, as they create political
incentives for increased market protection.
In addition to the negative effects of trade restrictions associated with economic sanc-
tions, political scientists have reached a consensus that observed economic sanctions are
unlikely to succeed. In fact, sanctions fail to elicit concessions between 65 and 95 percent
of the time (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 2007, Pape 1997). Sanctions are successful,
when the sanctioned country concedes to the demands of the sanctioning country. These
sanctions are often unobservable, because the concession is made before the sanction is
actually implemented. Few policymakers expect observed sanctions, particularly those
that endure for many years, to succeed in achieving concessions. Instead, these sanc-
tions are implemented, because the leaders of the sanctioning country benefit politically
from the sanctions (Smith 1996). Unsuccessful sanctions are implemented for largely
“symbolic” reasons (Lindsay 1986), particularly when the media publicizes human rights
abuses (Peksen, Peterson and Drury 2014) and citizens demand action but are unwilling
to pay the cost of military intervention.
Economic sanctions are often thought to be attractive policy tools, because they are
perceived as less costly than other alternatives for the sanctioning country (Lopez and
Cortright 1995). However, it is likely that policymakers have underestimated the cost of
sanctions. Economic sanctions are not only costly due to their immediate restriction of
trade flows, they also lead to long-term restrictions in international economic relations.
According to most modern economic theories, increased market protection is detrimental
to competition, efficiency and growth. In deciding whether to implement sanctions, pol-
icymakers must consider how effective the sanctions are likely to be in achieving policy
concessions, as well as the costs of the sanctions for producers and consumers, not only
while the sanctions are in place, but long after the sanctions are lifted. These costs may
outweigh the benefits of the sanction, particularly in those cases where the sanctions are
largely symbolic and carry little hope of success.
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CHAPTER IV
Varieties of Capital Account Liberalization
4.1 Introduction
Political scientists often use composite measures of financial openness, which collapse
information on multiple dimensions, frequently including: capital inflow restrictions, cap-
ital outflow restrictions, trade account restrictions, and exchange rate stability.1 Compos-
ite measures function well when each constitutive variable captures a similar phenomenon
and all variables are expected to have the same effect, in both direction and magnitude,
on the dependent variable or to be effected in the same way by other variables. However,
once the constitutive variables are collapsed into a single variable, it is impossible to mea-
sure their individual effects (Hays 2009, p. 28). Use of the composite measure may make
intuitive sense if the goal of the study is to capture a country’s integration into interna-
tional financial markets or to evaluate the influence of international financial markets on
the domestic economy. Conversely, if the goal of the study is to examine financial policy,
then these components must be examined separately, as they have various consequences
and they likely become attractive under different political conditions.
This chapter distinguishes between capital inflow restrictions and capital outflow re-
strictions. Inflow restrictions limit the entry of foreign or non-residents’ capital into the
1Studies frequently employ data from Karcher and Steinberg (2013) and Chinn and Ito (2008) (e.g.,
Leblang 1997, Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, Brooks and Kurtz 2007, Pepinsky 2013, Mukherjee,
Yadav and Be´jar 2014. See Quinn and Toyoda (2008) and Clark et al. (2012) for an overview of multiple
measures.
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country, while outflow restrictions limit the exit of residents’ capital from the country.
Capital flows include all movements of wealth between countries, including direct invest-
ment, portfolio investment, loans, deposits, and currency.
Inflow and outflow restrictions have opposing distributional consequences, as well as
conflicting implications for the bargaining power of domestic interest groups. Inflow
restrictions benefit domestic investors, who compete with foreign investors when foreign
capital is able to enter the market. In addition, inflow restrictions harm domestic labor,
who would benefit from the investment inflows that would enter the country but are
prohibited by the inflow restrictions. Foreign investment benefits labor through its impact
on wages. Alternatively, outflow restrictions benefit labor at the expense of domestic
investors. When capital outflows are liberalized, investors may take advantage of higher
returns abroad, and they may diversify their investment holdings to protect against risk.
Because labor benefits from investment, they do not want investors to leave the country,
and they therefore support the implementation of outflow restrictions. Consequently,
the preferences of domestic investors and labor are directly opposed: investors prefer
more inflow restrictions and fewer outflow restrictions, while labor prefers fewer inflow
restrictions and more outflow restrictions. As a result of these conflicting preferences,
policymakers face conflicting incentives in implementing restrictions on capital inflows
and on capital outflows.
In addition to these distributional consequences, outflow restrictions affect the relative
bargaining power of domestic interest groups. Because the preferences of investors and
labor are opposed - not just with respect to inflow and outflow restrictions but also with
respect to tax policy - bargaining power is of utmost importance. When policymakers de-
termine economic policies, they will be pressured by investors and labor groups, and the
influence of each group will depend on their bargaining power. Bargaining power often
comes from the actors’ outside option. The logic is straightforward: actors will not accept
less in an agreement than they could achieve without making the agreement. The amount
that they can secure without making the agreement is called their reservation value or
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outside option. In liberalizing outflows, policymakers actually give investors better out-
side options. When investors are able to move their investment to another location, they
may threaten to move their investment abroad and influence policy through this threat
of flight. This exit option is often associated with lower tax rates (see for example Oatley
1999, Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988), which should benefit investors. Alternatively,
the implementation of outflow restrictions benefits labor, because it eliminates investors’
outside option and thereby eliminates the bargaining power that investors gain from the
it.
Thus, policymakers not only use financial restrictions to affect the returns of different
factor owners, they also use financial restrictions to impact the relative influence of in-
vestors and labor in the future. Further, these two implications are mutually reinforcing.
Investors prefer fewer outflow restrictions for two reasons: an open outflow market gives
them greater flexibility in selecting investments with the highest returns and diversifying
their portfolio, and investors gain bargaining power from their ability to leave the market.
Thus, I expect policymakers to employ more inflow restrictions and fewer outflow restric-
tions, when political institutions and market structure favor the interests of investors over
labor.
Note that, according to the theory, restrictions on capital inflows and outflows move
in opposite directions from one another under certain conditions. Inflow restrictions
should be positively correlated with political institutions and market structure that favor
investors, while outflow restrictions should be negatively correlated with political insti-
tutions and market structure that favor investors. Composite measures are unable to
capture this divergence. When inflow and outflow restrictions are collapsed into one vari-
able, we assume that inflow and outflow restrictions are impacted in the same way, in
both direction and magnitude, by other variables.
While this paper focuses on differential incentives for the implementation of inflow
and outflow restrictions, the two types of restrictions are closely related to one another,
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and they are highly correlated.2 They are likely correlated for many reasons. Foremost
is that both types of liberalization are needed for countries to reap many of the benefits
of liberalization. For example, foreign investors may be deterred from entering a market
if there is uncertainty about whether they will be able to repatriate their profits. Con-
sequently, for liberalization to result in deeper, more developed financial markets with
the corresponding gains for efficiency and borrowing, both types of liberalization may be
necessary. Deep financial markets also make assets more mobile (Freeman and Quinn
2012), as even seemingly fixed assets may be traded on financial markets and the risk
associated with immobile assets may be spread across many owners through portfolio
diversification. In addition, IMF conditionality, or other types of international pressure,
likely lead to both types of liberalization. Consistent with these considerations, it is nec-
essary to account for the fact that inflow and outflow restrictions are not independent in
the empirical models. In fact, policymakers jointly consider inflow and outflow restric-
tions when they make financial policy. I use a system of equations specification, with
exogenous predictors of inflow and outflow restrictions, to jointly estimate the impact of
institutions and market structure on inflow restrictions and outflow restrictions.
Section 4.2 describes the consequences of inflow and outflow restrictions for market
returns and bargaining power and presents hypotheses for capital account policies under
different political conditions. Section 4.3 provides empirical evidence that is consistent
with the theory. Section 4.3.1 extends the theory to include bank entry restrictions
and presents preliminary evidence that restrictions on banking competition are likely
complementary to capital account restrictions, contrary to existing theoretical work. The
conclusion presents research implications.
2The correlation coefficient between inflow and outflow restrictions is: 0.751.
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4.2 Liberalization and Politics
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, trade liberalization increases returns to
abundant factor owners and decreases returns to scarce factor owners. When trade liber-
alization occurs, factor returns equalize across countries (Stolper and Samuelson 1941).
The idea is that countries will produce the goods that have the lowest relative production
cost for them; in other words, they produce those goods in which they have a comparative
advantage. Then, they trade with other countries for those goods that are more costly
for them to produce. The theorem has been applied in political science to explain trade
preferences in groups across countries. It is thought that labor should prefer trade liber-
alization when labor is abundant, i.e., in developing countries, and that capital owners
should prefer trade liberalization when capital is abundant, i.e., in developed countries
(e.g., Frieden 1991, Milner and Kubota 2005).
However, capital is also able to move across international borders, and so the trading
logic may be applied to explain capital flows. According to these theories, rather than
goods moving and the production process remaining fixed, capital travels to the location
where it receives the highest return. When capital markets are open, capital is thought to
move until those capital returns equalize.3 Because any production process requires some
capital and labor, the return to capital should be highest in locations with scarce capital
where the demand for capital is greater. Consequently, following financial liberalization,
capital is expected to move to locations where it is scarce, decreasing the return to capital
in those locations and increasing the returns to labor. In contrast, capital abundant re-
gions will experience a net capital outflow, increasing their capital returns and decreasing
labor returns. Political scientists have used this theory to derive expectations for policy
preferences: Labor should support capital account liberalization in developing countries,
while investors should support liberalization in developed countries (Pinto 2013, Quinn
and Incla´n 1997, Quinn 1997).
3For justifications of the differences in factor returns despite liberalization, see Robert E. Lucas (1990),
Caselli and Feyrer (2007).
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While these theories explain some of the variation in capital account policies, the em-
pirical record is not consistent. In fact, many surveys find that unskilled labor supports
trade and capital market protection in developing countries, where the theory predicts
they would have the most to gain from liberalization (Hicks, Milner and Tingley 2014).
The existing theoretical work likely suffers from assuming that investors or labor prefer all
types of liberalization or closure. Rather preferences of domestic actors are more specific
than support or opposition to liberalization writ large. I argue that domestic investors
support the removal of restrictions on capital outflows in conjunction with the main-
tenance or even strengthening of restrictions on capital inflows. Outflow liberalization
gives them the flexibility to take advantage of higher returns by moving their investment
abroad, to diversify their holdings and to use capital flight as a threat that constrains
policy. At the same time, investors prefer to maintain inflow restrictions, which protect
their investments in their home market from competition with foreign investors. Outflow
liberalization accompanied by inflow restrictions enable them to take advantage of higher
returns elsewhere without jeopardizing their position in their home market.
Importantly, the benefits of outflow liberalization and inflow restrictions accrue to
investors whether capital is abundant or scarce in their home country. Once we separate
the determination of inflow and outflow restrictions, the preferences of investors and
labor no longer depend on the factor endowment or development level of their country.
When factor returns are high in their home market, investors will often retain their
investments in their country, but they still benefit from inflow restrictions, which reduce
competition from foreign investors in their home market, and from the liberalization of
outflow restrictions, which allow them to invest abroad. Following outflow liberalization,
investors are not only able to put their investments in the location of highest return, they
also know that if policymakers increase tax rates or select expropriatory policies, they
can move their capital abroad. The possibility of capital flight provides investors with an
outside option, which grants them more leverage in bargaining with policymakers over
financial policy decisions. Consequently, investors prefer to have the investment options
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associated with an open outflow market, which also helps constrain policymakers, while
at the same time to have the market protection afforded by restrictions on capital inflows.
Further, investors share these preferences in both developed and developing countries.
The policies employed by French President Franc¸ois Mitterrand and the immediate
response of financial actors illustrates the constraining power of capital, when markets
are open. Mitterrand was elected in 1981 on a platform of leftist economic policies, in-
cluding: multiple nationalizations; higher taxes [on the wealthy], wages, pension benefits,
and workers’ rights; and reduced working hours. Before many of the policies were even
implemented, Mitterrand’s election victory induced capital flight, which brought on a 10
percent devaluation of the French Franc (Brown 1996, p. 69). “In mid-1981, the economic
expansion attempted by the new French Socialist government rapidly confronted a large
capital outflow and a run on the franc, leading to a reversal of the policies soon after
their adoption” (Frieden 1991, p. 427). The capital flight triggered by Mitterrand’s poli-
cies and the subsequent reversal of those policies demonstrate the benefits of liberalized
outflow markets for investors. When investors have the ability to move their investment
elsewhere, they may use that outside option to constrain policymakers. Although capital
flight actually occurred in Mitterrand’s case, it is generally accepted that the threat of
flight, or of underinvestment in the future, is enough to persuade policymakers to select
pro-capital policies (Oatley 1999, Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988).
Assumption 4.1. Investors prefer increased restrictions on capital inflows and decreased
restrictions on capital outflows.
The same distributional and bargaining theories also help explain the preferences of
labor over capital account policies. If we believe that factor returns are impacted by
market scarcity, then labor benefits directly from reductions in inflow restrictions. In-
vestment inflows increase wages, as the demand for labor increases. In addition, inflow
liberalization does not diminish their bargaining power vis-a´-vis investors. Thus, labor
should support liberalization of restrictions on capital inflows. Conversely, labor loses
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bargaining power from the liberalization of outflow restrictions. When outflow restric-
tions are removed, investors can credibly threaten to move their investment elsewhere
if higher tax rates are implemented. The rapid reversal of Mitterrand’s leftist policies
show the power of investors when markets are open. In order to avoid that type of policy
reversal and to maintain their bargaining power, labor should support the maintenance
of restrictions on capital outflows. Consequently, labor’s preferences are the opposite of
investors’ preferences. Labor prefers reduced restrictions on capital inflows and increased
restrictions on capital outflows.
In order to evaluate the theory, it is necessary to know when political institutions and
market structure favor the interests of capital and when they favor the interests of labor.
It is widely accepted that small, concentrated groups are better able to pursue collective
action (most prominently from Olson 1965). Because concentrated groups organize more
easily, they have an advantage in lobbying policymakers and realizing their policy goals.4
Investors are more concentrated and, therefore, better able to exercise political influence
when the banking sector is concentrated (Pepinsky 2013, Mukherjee, Yadav and Be´jar
2014).
Furthermore, certain political institutions are more vulnerable to capture by specific
interest groups. When political institutions create an incentive to cultivate the personal
vote (Carey and Shugart 1995), they are more responsive to small, influential interest
groups often called “particularist interests.” Investors are an example of a particularist
interest group: They are a relatively small, often concentrated group with specific in-
terests that often do not coincide with the interests of labor. Labor is a large, diffuse
group. Investors are even more likely to impact policy through personalist institutions
when they are concentrated. One way to capture their concentration is to use a measure
of bank concentration. When institutions favor particularist interests and when investors
are concentrated, I expect policymakers to implement the preferred policies of investors.
4This logic is clearly outlined in the trade literature (e.g., Schattschneider 1935, Busch and Reinhardt
1999, McGillivray 2004, Hiscox 2010).
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Thus, there should be more restrictions on capital inflows and fewer restrictions on capital
outflows under particularist institutions when the banking sector is concentrated.
Hypothesis 4.2. When the banking sector is concentrated, personalism increases restric-
tions on capital inflows and decreases restrictions on capital inflows.
Carey and Shugart (1995) provide a careful overview of institutions that create “in-
centives to cultivate a personal vote.” Their data incorporate much of the existing theo-
retical work about which institutions are vulnerable to capture by small interest groups.
The incentive to cultivate a personal vote index (hereafter ‘personalism’) is based on
the following variables: “(1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on
ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of
co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple
votes or a party-level vote” (the original index is from Carey and Shugart 1995; updated
data are available from Johnson and Wallack 2012). Consistent with the personalism
measure, McGillivray (2004) establishes a strong connection between weak parties and
trade protection, arguing that candidates are more susceptible to particularist protec-
tionist interests when they are not accountable to a national party. Party strength is
captured by all the dimensions in Carey and Shugart’s personalism index. Mukherjee,
Yadav and Be´jar (2014) likewise use personalism to assess the effect of personalist insti-
tutions, moderated by bank concentration, on capital account openness writ large. They
do not differentiate between inflow and outflow restrictions.
The capital inflow and outflow restrictions implemented by policymakers in Madagas-
car and Cameroon help illustrate the logic of the theory. In 2005, Madagascar’s political
institutions were far more personalistic and their banking sector more concentrated than
Cameroon’s political institutions and banking sector. Madagascar’s personalism score
was 10 (the highest possible is 12), while Cameroon’s personalism score was one, and
the largest three banks in Madagascar owned 87.4 percent of the banking assets in the
country, while the largest three banks in Cameroon owned 53.9 percent of the banking
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assets in the country. Thus, according to Hypothesis 4.2, Madagascar should have more
restrictions on capital inflows and fewer restrictions on capital outflows than Cameroon,
and that is what we observe. Madagascar had three times as many restrictions on capital
inflows (score of 37.5, where the most restricted markets score 50) than on capital outflows
(score of 12.5, again out of 50). Cameroon had fewer restrictions on capital inflows (25
out of 50) and more restrictions on capital outflows (50 out of 50). Although both coun-
tries have negative capital account openness scores on composite indices (Karcher and
Steinberg 2013),5 they protect their capital markets in substantially different ways with
Madagascar focusing on inflow restrictions and Cameroon focusing on outflow restric-
tions. These are just two data points selected to illustrate the theory and data. The next
section turns to a more rigorous analysis of the empirical record, using cross-sectional,
time-series data.
4.3 Inflow and Outflow Restrictions
Hypothesis 4.2 provides a conditional argument: when banks are concentrated, per-
sonalism increases restrictions on capital inflows and decreases restrictions on capital
outflows. In order to assess whether the theory is consistent with evidence, the regression
models include an interaction term between bank concentration and personalism.
Restrictionsi,t = β0 + β1Personalismi,t ∗ Concentrationi,t + β2Personalismi,t
+β3Concentrationi,t + β4Controlsi,t + 
The dependent variable is either inflow or outflow restrictions. β1Concentrationi,t+β2 are
the coefficients of interest. I expect β1Concentrationi,t+β2 to be positive in the regression
on inflow restrictions and negative in the regression on outflow restrictions when banks are
concentrated, i.e., the concentration variable is large. The theory predicts that investors
have more policy control when banks are concentrated and institutions are personalist.
5Karcher and Steinberg (2013) update the Chinn and Ito (2008) composite measure of financial
openness. Madagascar has a capital account openness score of -0.0316, while Cameroon’s score is -1.08.
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Data on inflow and outflow restrictions are coded using the IMF’s Annual Report on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (Freeman and Quinn 2012, Quinn and
Toyoda 2008). Restrictions are classified on a directional basis: “resident direct invest-
ment abroad [outflow restrictions] and nonresident investment in the reporting economy
[inflow restrictions]” (International Monetary Fund 1993, p. 80). The IMF codes restric-
tions on the following types of capital flows: direct investment, where the investor
seeks a significant voice in the management of the enterprise (including equity capital,
reinvested earnings, etc); portfolio investment, which excludes managerial oversight
and also includes money market debt instruments, financial derivatives, longer-term debt,
and equity securities; other investment, including trade credits, loans, currency and
deposits, use of IMF credit, IMF loans, etc; and reserve assets, which consist of mone-
tary gold, SDRs, reserve position in the Fund, foreign exchange, etc. The variable then
sums up the number of restrictions in these four investment areas. The data cover 106
countries from 1950 to 2005.
Personalism is from the Database of Particularism (Johnson and Wallack 2012); the
data cover 72 countries from 1978 to 2005. Bank concentration is the assets of the
three largest banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks from the Financial
Development and Financial Structure Database (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine 2000,
2009, Ciha´k et al. 2012).6 Controls include international debt as a percent of GDP (also
from the Financial Development and Financial Structure Database), GDP from the Penn
World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012), and total trade (imports plus exports
divided by GDP from Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009, Barbieri and Keshk 2012), as
well as whether a country is under an IMF loan program (Dreher 2006). Once the data
samples are merged, the data used in the regression models cover 57 countries from
1998 to 2005. There are 6.9 years on average for each country in the sample with a
minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 8 years.7 Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics
6The data cover 1960 to 2011, but there are many missing observations.
7Results from models without controls are consistent and include more observations; without controls
there are 7.2 years for each country on average, and there are 80 countries in the sample.
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for the variables used in the analysis. The subsequent section describes the bank entry
variable, which measures the difficulty of market entry for new and foreign banks (Adiad,
Detragiache and Tressel 2008).
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year 2001.58 2.29 1998 2005 575
Inflow Restrictions 38.83 11.48 12.5 50 575
Outflow Restrictions 38.04 14.12 0 50 575
Personalism 5.83 3.87 1 12 575
Bank Concentration 67.86 20.32 21.4 100 575
International Debt 22.04 20.28 0.45 109.99 404
GDP (billions) 482.56 1357.82 1.65 12564.30 559
Total Trade 0.39 0.32 0 2.31 559
IMF Program 0.29 0.57 0 4 575
Bank Entry 2.72 0.61 0 3 473
Table 4.2 reports the results of OLS regression models. Although there are controls for
the effect of inflow restrictions on outflow restrictions and the effect of outflow restrictions
on inflow restrictions, the model incorrectly assumes that all the independent variables
may be treated as exogenous. Despite these limitations, which will be discussed in the
subsequent analysis, the OLS regressions provide a useful plausibility probe. They assess
the correlation between personalism, moderated by banking concentration, and inflow
restrictions and then outflow restrictions. All columns report the regression results of
models with controls. Columns (2) and (4) include a lagged dependent variable to help
alleviate the concern of serial correlation. Consistent with the hypotheses introduced
above, when banks are concentrated, the predicted effect of personalism on inflow restric-
tions is positive and the predicted effect of personalism on outflow restrictions is negative.
The predicted effect of personalism on inflow restrictions becomes positive when the three
largest banks in the country control 83.02 percent of the total assets of all commercial
banks (using the estimates in Column (1) of Table 4.2). The predicted effect of personal-
ism on outflow restrictions becomes positive when the three largest banks in the country
control 85.59 percent of the total assets of all commercial banks (using the estimates in
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Table 4.2: Capital Account Restrictions (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflow Inflow Outflow Outflow
lag Inflow Restrictions 0.838∗∗∗
(0.0504)
Outflow Restrictions 0.703∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.0674) (0.0400)
lag Outflow Restrictions 0.776∗∗∗
(0.0609)
Inflow Restrictions 0.841∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.0803) (0.0638)
Personalism * Bank Concentration 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.000457 -0.0118 -0.00765∗
(0.00724) (0.00230) (0.00922) (0.00403)
Personalism -1.760∗∗∗ -0.0623 1.010 0.549∗
(0.543) (0.172) (0.691) (0.286)
Bank Concentration -0.124∗∗ 0.0165 0.0931 0.0679∗∗
(0.0535) (0.0142) (0.0666) (0.0294)
International Debt -0.0449 -0.0239∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.00194
(0.0453) (0.0110) (0.0547) (0.0157)
GDP 1.10∗∗∗ 0.185 -0.191 -0.0911
(0.390) (0.127) (0.330) (0.104)
Total Trade 1.995 0.239 0.324 -0.0932
(2.446) (0.661) (1.481) (0.481)
IMF Program 1.615 0.438 -2.085 -0.477
(1.398) (0.296) (1.957) (0.513)
Constant 21.22∗∗∗ -0.0706 -2.904 -4.804∗
(4.592) (1.181) (6.774) (2.870)
N 388 388 388 388
adj. R2 0.653 0.925 0.671 0.904
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
country; dependent variable is listed in table header, below model number.
Column (3) of Table 4.2). However, the effects of personalism for inflow and outflow
restrictions are not significant by conventional standards when bank concentration takes
on large values. Figure 4.1 plots the marginal effect of personalism at different values
of bank concentration for inflow restrictions (left panel) and outflow restrictions (right
panel). Without controls, the results are similar in magnitude and significance.8
Although capital inflows and outflows have conflicting implications for factor returns
and for bargaining power, they are also closely related. As discussed in the introductory
8The results without controls are not reported here, but they are available from the author upon
request.
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Figure 4.1: Marginal Effect of Personalism (OLS)
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Note: confidence intervals are 95%. Predictions from columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.2.
section, they are likely related for many reasons. Both types of liberalization may be
necessary for countries to attract foreign investment. More specifically, investors may
be deterred from entering a market if there is uncertainty about whether they will be
able to repatriate their profits. In addition, in order to diversify domestic holdings, it
may be necessary to sell them to foreign investors. Furthermore, international pressure
may encourage both types of liberalization. Consistent with these considerations, it is
necessary to account for the fact that inflow and outflow restrictions are jointly determined
and, therefore, unlikely to be independent from one another in the empirical models.
Scholars often estimate systems of equations models to deal with independent variables
that are jointly determined. Alt and Lowry (1994) use three-stage least squares (here-
after 3SLS) to account for endogenously determined variables (Greene 2008, p. 381-383),
while others have used seemingly unrelated regression when the two equations they wish
to identify have correlated error terms (hereafter SUR) (Greene 2008, p. 254-263). By
estimating the errors in these systems of equations simultaneously, both modeling tech-
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niques help account for the correlation between the equations. SUR allows the equations
to be linked only through their disturbances and does not account for the interdependence
of the dependent variables. The greater the correlation between the equations, the more
efficiency is gained by using SUR (Greene 2008, p. 257). The SUR model allows me to
test for the correlation between the two models using the Breusch-Pagan test statistic.
The statistic tests whether the disturbances from the two models are related (the null
hypothesis is that they are unrelated).
3SLS employs exogenous variables as instruments for the variables that are deter-
mined endogenously and then computes the standard errors for the system of equations
together. 3SLS relies on the analyst selecting plausibly exogenous variables. These vari-
ables provide exogenous sources of variation in the dependent variable of one equation,
which are also independent variables in the other equation, and they are unrelated to
the dependent variable in the other equation. The system of equations is identified by
putting an exogenous variable in each equation [and not in the other equation]. In the
3SLS regression on inflow restrictions, I use GDP as the identifying, exogenous predic-
tor. Wealthy countries are often concerned about currency appreciation, as appreciation
makes it more difficult for them to export their products. They implement inflow re-
strictions in order to prevent the purchase (and thereby appreciation) of their currency.
GDP is likely to meet the exclusion restriction, because it is not theoretically related
to outflow restrictions, and it does not reach significance in any of the OLS regressions
on outflow restrictions. In the 3SLS regression on outflow restrictions, I use the amount
of international debt as the identifying, exogenous predictor. Countries that carry more
international debt often need to hold foreign currency in order to repay their debt. They
are more likely to implement outflow restrictions in order to protect their foreign currency
reserves (and the value of their currency). Furthermore, there is no direct reason that
international debt should be related to inflow restrictions. In sum, GDP, international
debt, personalism, bank concentration, total trade and IMF program are treated as ex-
ogenous variables, while inflow and outflow restrictions are endogenous variables in the
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3SLS models.
Results for the SUR and 3SLS models are reported in Table 4.3 and the marginal effect
of personalism is presented in Figure 4.2. As expected, personalism is positively corre-
lated with inflow restrictions at high levels of bank concentration, and the relationship
is significant at the five percent level. In addition, personalism is negatively correlated
with outflow restrictions, at high levels of bank concentration, although the effect is in-
significant at conventional levels. Once the lagged dependent variable is introduced, both
correlations fail significance tests and the correlation between outflow restrictions and
the interaction term even switches signs. This is perhaps due to the limited time series
of the data and limited variation within countries of the institutional variables. The
Breusch-Pagan test statistic reveals that the disturbances in each of the SUR models
are not unrelated (they are likely related to one another) and that the system of equa-
tions specifications is therefore more appropriate than the individual OLS specifications.
The empirical model provides robust evidence that personalist political institutions are
positively correlated with inflow restrictions when banks are concentrated. Personalist
political institutions are negatively correlated with outflow restrictions when banks are
concentrated, but the association is insignificant.
The evidence for the effect of political institutions and market structure on outflow
restrictions is more robust than the evidence on inflow restrictions. As said, the signs on
the interaction terms in the regression on inflow restrictions actually change when the
lagged dependent variable is introduced in the model (although they are not significant).
The explanation for the lack of consistency in the results for inflow restrictions may be
driven by data limitations or other factors, but it may also be that banks’ preference for
closing inflow markets is ambiguous, while their preference for open outflow markets is
unmistakeable. Recall that liberalizing outflows gives investors more investment options
to pursue higher returns in any open market, and it simultaneously increases their ability
to influence policy in their home market. These two benefits of liberalized outflows
for investors likely reinforce one another. Investors’ preferences for inflow restrictions,
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Table 4.3: Capital Account Restrictions (SUR & 3SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SUR SUR 3SLS 3SLS
Dependent Variable: Inflow Restrictions
lag Inflow Restrictions 0.904∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0259)
Outflow Restrictions 0.866∗∗∗ 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ -0.00191
(0.0236) (0.0193) (0.108) (0.0247)
Personalism * Bank Concentration 0.0189∗∗∗ -0.000107 0.0246∗∗∗ -0.00149
(0.00452) (0.00223) (0.00506) (0.00233)
Personalism -1.478∗∗∗ 0.00752 -2.028∗∗∗ 0.111
(0.312) (0.157) (0.360) (0.163)
Bank Concentration -0.136∗∗∗ 0.0221 -0.131∗∗∗ 0.0333∗
(0.0338) (0.0162) (0.0363) (0.0172)
GDP (trillions) 0.307∗ 0.158 1.52∗∗∗ 0.132
(0.179) (0.119) (0.350) (0.107)
Total Trade -0.672 -0.110 3.139∗∗ 0.151
(1.152) (0.542) (1.579) (0.575)
IMF Program 1.841∗∗ 0.309 1.199 0.137
(0.765) (0.358) (0.848) (0.380)
Constant 15.27∗∗∗ -0.458 29.76∗∗∗ -0.566
(2.517) (1.332) (4.619) (1.406)
Dependent Variable: Outflow Restrictions
lag Outflow Restrictions 0.842∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0274)
Inflow Restrictions 1.048∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.0880∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0263) (0.119) (0.0310)
Personalism * Bank Concentration -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.00600∗∗ -0.00927∗ -0.00521∗
(0.00483) (0.00263) (0.00532) (0.00272)
Personalism 1.330∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.802∗∗ 0.344∗
(0.328) (0.178) (0.370) (0.185)
Bank Concentration 0.133∗∗∗ 0.0593∗∗∗ 0.0814∗∗ 0.0540∗∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0201) (0.0400) (0.0208)
International Debt 0.0347∗∗ 0.000965 0.124∗∗∗ 0.0000514
(0.0145) (0.0115) (0.0245) (0.0101)
Total Trade 0.787 -0.0801 0.765 0.0924
(1.288) (0.714) (1.443) (0.730)
IMF Program -2.003∗∗ -0.319 -2.055∗∗ -0.280
(0.826) (0.448) (0.834) (0.464)
Constant -12.44∗∗∗ -3.388∗∗ 0.895 -1.750
(2.874) (1.618) (6.003) (1.696)
Breusch-Pagan: chi2 210.667 31.485
Test for Independence of the Two Equations (0.000) (0.000)
N 388 388 388 388
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Effect of Personalism (3SLS)
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Note: confidence intervals are 95%. Predictions from Column (3) of Table 4.3.
on the other hand, are likely weaker. Consistent with the extension of Stolper and
Samuelson’s well-known arguments, investors themselves benefit from [inflow] restrictions,
through their impact on competition and interest rates. However, not all financial actors
compete with foreign investment, and some financial actors actually benefit from foreign
investment.
In particular, if foreign investment must be channelled through domestic intermedi-
aries, who are able to charge a premium on these transactions, then domestic interme-
diaries may profit from liberalized inflows. The singleminded focus on capital account
restrictions, at the expense of other types of financial restrictions, is a stark limitation in
most work on financial policy in political science, which focuses predominantly on factor
returns using a Stolper-Samuelson type model. One important exception is Pepinsky
(2013), who argues that banks prefer an open capital account when foreign bank entry is
restricted. The following analysis extends Pepinsky’s argument to account for the effect
of different political institutions, under different market structures, on inflow restrictions.
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4.3.1 Bank Entry Restrictions
Distinguishing between the preferences of financial actors when bank entry is liberal-
ized and when it is restricted provides a more nuanced theory of economic policymaking.
First, when bank entry is liberalized, financial actors should prefer increased restrictions
on capital inflows, as the restrictions prevent foreign competition. However, when bank
entry is restricted, financial actors should prefer liberalized capital inflows. The bank
entry restrictions force foreign investors to channel their investments through domestic
intermediaries, who benefit from their privileged position in their home market. Thus,
financial actors should either prefer restricted bank entry and open inflow markets or
restricted inflow markets and open bank entry. In this way, bank entry restrictions and
capital inflow restrictions are expected to substitute for one another: bank entry re-
strictions provide protection from foreign financial intermediaries, while capital inflow
restrictions provide protection from competition with foreign investors. As before, the
preferences of financial actors are more likely realized when financial actors are concen-
trated and political institutions favor particularist interests.
Hypothesis 4.3. When bank entry is restricted, bankers prefer decreased restrictions on
capital inflows. Bankers’ preferences are more likely to be realized when bank concentra-
tion and personalism increase.
Hypothesis 4.4. When bank entry is open, bankers prefer increased restrictions on cap-
ital inflows. Bankers’ preferences are more likely to be realized when bank concentration
and personalism increase.
In order to evaluate the hypotheses, we first need a variable that measures bank entry.
Adiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) code the openness of a country to bank entry for
91 countries from 1973-2005; they use indicators of whether foreign and domestic banks
may enter the market, whether branching is restricted and whether banks may provide
varied services (p. 16). Their index ranges from fully repressed bank entry, 0, to fully
liberalized bank entry, 3. After the data is merged, the sample includes 49 countries.
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Hypotheses 4.3 and 4.4 relate personalist institutions to capital account controls in the
presence and absence of bank entry restrictions and concentrated banks. Consequently,
three conditional variables are needed: personalism, bank concentration and bank entry.
Although I will again utilize the 3SLS model, I will focus on the equation predicting
inflow restrictions. The specification of the second equation on outflow restrictions in the
3SLS model remains the same from the previous section, as investors prefer the ability
to invest abroad, whether bank entry is restricted or not. Hypotheses 4.3 and 4.4 are
interactive and require the inclusion of the following variables in the regression model:
InflowRestrictionsi,t = β0 + β1Personalismi,t ∗ Concentrationi,t ∗ Entryi,t
+β2Personalismi,t∗Concentrationi,t+β3Concentrationi,t∗Entryi,t+β4Personalismi,t∗
Entryi,t + β5Personalismi,t + β6Concentrationi,t + β7Entryi,t + β8Controlsi,t + 
The hypotheses provide theoretical predictions regarding the marginal effect of personal-
ism, when bank concentration is high. Thus, we will look at the following terms closely:
β1Concentrationi,t ∗ Entryi,t + β2Concentrationi,t + β4Entryi,t + β5
When bank entry is restricted, bankers prefer that foreign capital enter the market,
as it must flow through their branches. Thus, I expect personalist institutions to be
negatively associated with inflow restrictions, when banks are concentrated and bank
entry is restricted. Therefore, I expect that β2Concentrationi,t + β5 is less than zero
when concentration is restricted (β2Concentrationi,t + β5 is equivalent to the marginal
effect of personalism when bank entry is fully restricted, Entryi,t = 0).
Alternatively, when bank entry is liberalized, bankers seek protection from foreign
investment. Bankers’ preferences are likely realized when banks are concentrated and in-
stitutions personalist. In sum, capital inflow restrictions should be positively correlated
with personalism at high levels of bank concentration when bank entry is open. Con-
sequently, I expect that as bank entry liberalization increases the effect of personalism,
at high levels of banking concentration, becomes positive. Consistent with Hypothesis
4.4, I expect that personalism moderated by bank concentration, β1Concentrationi,t ∗
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Figure 4.3: Marginal Effect of Personalism on Inflow Restrictions (3SLS)
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Note: confidence intervals are 95%. Predictions from Column (1) of Table 4.4.
Entryi,t + β2Concentrationi,t + β4Entryi,t + β5, is greater than zero when concentration
and entry are large.
Table 4.4 reports the results of the 3SLS regression with the triple interaction term,
which was the only model that accounted for the simultaneous selection of inflow and out-
flow restrictions. Figure 4.3 plots the marginal effects of personalism for different levels
of bank concentration and bank entry. The results are inconsistent with the hypothe-
ses. Figure 4.3 shows that the correlation between personalism and entry restrictions
increases as banking concentration increases for all levels of bank entry restrictions (the
slopes are positive in all four panels). In fact, the slopes are steeper in the models with
more bank entry restrictions and, at high levels of bank concentration, the predicted
effect of personalism is positive. According to the hypotheses, the predicted effect of per-
sonalism should become negative at high levels of bank concentration when bank entry is
liberalized, although the correlation does not become statistically-significantly positive,
by conventional levels of significance, in any of the panels.
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Table 4.4: Bank Entry and Capital Account Restrictions
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Inflow Restrictions
lag Inflow Restrictions 0.942∗∗∗
(0.0278)
Outflow Restrictions 0.500∗∗∗ 0.0105
(0.150) (0.0274)
Personalism * Bank Concentration * Bank Entry -0.0245∗∗ -0.00566
(0.0124) (0.00447)
Personalism * Bank Concentration 0.0869∗∗ 0.0155
(0.0358) (0.0130)
Personalism * Bank Entry 1.987∗∗ 0.393
(0.815) (0.246)
Bank Concentration * Bank Entry 0.139∗ 0.00447
(0.0807) (0.0261)
Personalism -6.940∗∗∗ -1.039
(2.361) (0.707)
Bank Concentration -0.446∗∗ 0.0171
(0.222) (0.0748)
Bank Entry -9.490∗∗ -0.756
(4.558) (1.451)
GDP (trillions) 0.978∗∗∗ 0.151
(0.311) (0.108)
Total Trade 1.879 0.304
(1.731) (0.565)
IMF Program 1.094 0.238
(0.820) (0.373)
Constant 50.02∗∗∗ 1.769
(17.17) (4.194)
Dependent Variable: Outflow Restrictions
lag Outflow Restrictions 0.865∗∗∗
(0.0300)
Inflow Restrictions 0.959∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.0747) (0.0335)
Personalism * Bank Concentration -0.0143∗∗∗ -0.00470∗
(0.00497) (0.00276)
Personalism 1.023∗∗∗ 0.313∗
(0.334) (0.184)
Bank Concentration 0.0808∗∗ 0.0430∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0211)
International Debt 0.0766∗∗∗ -0.00312
(0.0239) (0.0113)
Total Trade 1.203 0.333
(1.360) (0.743)
IMF Program -1.925∗∗ -0.232
(0.834) (0.470)
Constant -6.055 -1.706
(4.030) (1.686)
N 349 349
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.
102
Thus, rather than bank entry restrictions and capital inflow restrictions being substi-
tutes as theorized, their relationship is very weak in the data. If there is a relationship,
it is likely that they are complements, as the estimated effect of personalism on inflow
restrictions is largest when bank entry is open and the banking sector is are concentrated,
although the effect is still insignificant. Given this finding, it is likely that financial ac-
tors prefer inflow restrictions and bank entry restrictions, and they are better equipped
to acquire their preferred policies when political institutions are personalist. Banks in
particular benefit from restrictions on foreign bank entry, and domestic investors benefit
from restrictions on foreign capital inflows. Under personalist political institutions, both
types of financial actors are able to obtain their preferred policies. The results are weakly
consistent with the idea that financial actors want all the protection they can acquire,
and they are more likely to get it under personalist institutions.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argue that the consequences of inflow and outflow restrictions for the
distribution of factor returns and for bargaining power reinforce one another. Investors
prefer greater inflow restrictions and fewer outflow restrictions, as they want to benefit
from more investment options without competing with foreign capital owners. Conversely,
labor groups prefer fewer inflow restrictions and greater outflow restrictions, as they would
like capital to enter and remain in the market. The preferences of investors are likely to
be implemented when they are concentrated and political institutions are susceptible to
capture by concentrated groups. The empirical model provides evidence that is consistent
with the theory. Personalist political institutions are positively correlated with inflow
restrictions when banks are concentrated. Personalist political institutions are negatively
correlated with outflow restrictions when banks are concentrated, but the association is
insignificant in many models.
The analysis presented here helps resolve two puzzles in the empirical literature. First,
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scholars have argued that policymakers must liberalize the capital account to attract
foreign investment. At the same time, they expect policymakers to close the capital
account when they need to retain foreign currency. Previous studies were unable to
assess these arguments, because they theoretically and empirically lumped inflow and
outflow restrictions together. The empirical strategy pursued here provides evidence
for both of these seemingly contradictory arguments. Inflow and outflow liberalization
(or closure) are highly correlated, which is consistent with the idea that policymakers
pursue capital account openness in order to attract foreign investment. However, once the
correlation between inflow and outflow restrictions is accounted for, outflow restrictions
are positively correlated with international debt, which is consistent with the argument
that policymakers limit capital outflows when they need to retain foreign currency.
In addition, scholars have found weak evidence for theories based on preferences de-
rived from Stolper-Samuelson models (Hicks, Milner and Tingley 2014). Although the
weakness may stem from a lack of factor mobility across sectors, it is possible that it
also comes from domestic interest groups’ divergent preferences about capital inflows and
outflows.9 Labor in particular is likely to support inflow liberalization and outflow re-
strictions, while investors support inflow restrictions and outflow liberalization in their
home markets. Thus, the inconsistency of the empirical findings may be due to domestic
actors’ conflicting preferences with respect to capital inflows and outflows.
Many researchers study international capital markets, because they believe that there
is great potential to increase efficiency, growth, and development through capital market
liberalization. They have sought to estimate the relationship between financial openness
and growth, and they have found weak evidence for the correlation.10 More nuanced
studies have focused on the effect of openness in the presence of property rights or already
competitive markets, with the idea that openness cannot help the economy much if there
9This is much like the distinction that Hays (2009) identifies in trade politics with firms benefiting
from exports and losing out from foreign imports.
10For example, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Henry (2007) find that liberalization in-
creases growth, while Klein and Olivei (2008) and Schularick and Steger (2010) find the opposite. See
Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) and Kose et al. (2009) for an overview of the literature.
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is another deterrent to capital accumulation (Rajan and Zingales 2003, Chinn and Ito
2006, Prasad et al. 2007, Broner and Ventura 2010). If the international community
remains dedicated to reaping the gains of liberal capital flows, it must consider which
restrictions are in place, how they impact growth and development, and why they were
implemented in order to determine how best to encourage liberalization.
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4.5 Appendix
Countries included in the regression models: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France,
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore,
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Russia, Egypt, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.
Once the regression model includes bank entry, the following countries are included
in the sample: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
Many contemporary economic theories are based on the idea that market liberaliza-
tion carries broad benefits for countries as a whole. Like most policies, however, eco-
nomic liberalization creates winners and losers. At the same time, liberalization alters
the bargaining power of different interest groups and affects institutional stability. Be-
cause market liberalization has repercussions for economic returns and bargaining power,
the conditions under which liberalization is pursued are complex and contextual. In
this dissertation, I began the process of disentangling the political incentives for mar-
ket liberalization. Understanding economic policy requires a nuanced understanding of
the economic impact of each policy, the preferences of relevant actors, and the political
institutions, as well as their durability, of the countries under analysis.
5.1 Chapter Summary
Chapter 2 outlines a theory of market liberalization in autocracies. Because many au-
tocracies gain legitimacy from economic growth, liberalization can provide a key source
of legitimacy. At the same time, liberalization limits redistribution, as it provides the
owners of mobile assets with an exit option. This limited redistribution decreases the
cost of democratization, thereby making autocracy itself less necessary for the mainte-
nance of concentrated economic wealth. Thus, liberalization not only has implications
for economic returns and inequality, it also impacts the stability of political institutions.
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Chapter 3 details the impact of economic sanctions on market restrictions. Because
economic sanctions restrict flows of goods and capital across countries, they benefit spe-
cific actors in the sanctioned country. Those actors who benefit from the market pro-
tection afforded by sanctions may then use their newfound economic [which likely leads
to political] power to influence policy. And, because they benefited from the market
restrictions inherent in sanctions, they will likely pressure the government to implement
new market restrictions in order to protect their gains. Due to the protection-inducing
impact of sanctions, the use of sanctions for coercion, particularly when they are often
unsuccessful in achieving policy concessions, should be reconsidered.
Chapter 4 divides market liberalization into two parts: the liberalization of capital
inflow restrictions and the liberalization of capital outflow restrictions. The two types
of restrictions have divergent effects for domestic investors and labor groups. Inflow
restrictions benefit domestic investors, as they do not have to compete with foreign in-
vestment, at the expense of labor groups. Outflow restrictions, on the other hand, benefit
domestic labor, as they can pressure policymakers to increase tax rates without fear that
investment will flee the country. Thus, understanding capital account policy requires the
separation of inflow and outflow restrictions, because their implications cut in opposite
directions. I find that political institutions and market structure, which privilege capital
owners, are associated with fewer outflow restrictions and more inflow restrictions.
This dissertation advances our understanding of the political foundations of economic
development. Market liberalization is important for capital accumulation and efficient
investment. However, economic policies are often selected for political purposes, and
they may or may not foster economic growth. The three studies presented here improve
our understanding of economic policymaking by investigating the interconnectedness of
political institutions and economic policies, of sanctions and political power, and of dif-
ferent types of liberalization. Future research should continue to assess not only the
distributional effects of economic policy but also how these distributional effects impact
bargaining power, future policy, and ultimately political institutions.
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